




We formalize the idea of probability distributions that lead to reliable predictions
about some, but not all aspects of a domain. The resulting notion of ‘safety’ provides a
fresh perspective on foundational issues in statistics, providing a middle ground between
imprecise probability and multiple-prior models on the one hand and strictly Bayesian
approaches on the other. It also allows us to formalize fiducial distributions in terms
of the set of random variables that they can safely predict, thus taking some of the
sting out of the fiducial idea. By restricting probabilistic inference to safe uses, one also
automatically avoids paradoxes such as the Monty Hall problem. Safety comes in a variety
of degrees, such as ‘validity’ (the strongest notion), ‘calibration’, ‘confidence safety’ and
‘unbiasedness’ (almost the weakest notion).
1 Introduction
We formalize the idea of probability distributions that lead to reliable predictions about some,
but not all aspects of a domain. Very broadly speaking, we call a distribution P̃ safe for
predicting random variable U given random variable V if predictions concerning U based on
P̃ (U |V ) tend to be as good as one would expect them to be if P̃ were an accurate description
of one’s uncertainty, even if P̃ may not represent one’s actual beliefs, let alone the truth.
Our formalization of this notion of ‘safety’ has repercussions for the foundations of statistics,
providing a joint perspective on issues hitherto viewed as distinct:
1. All models are wrong...1 Some statistical models are evidently both entirely wrong
yet very useful. For example, in some highly successful applications of Bayesian statistics,
such as latent Dirichlet allocation for topic modeling (Blei et al., 2003), one assumes that
natural language text is i.i.d., which is fine for the task at hand (topic modeling) — yet no-one
would want to use these models for predicting the next word of a text given the past. Yet,
one can use a Bayesian posterior to make such predictions any way — Bayesian inference has
no mechanism to distinguish between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ inferences. Safe probability allows
us to impose such a distinction.
2. The Eternal Discussion2 More generally, representing uncertainty by a single distri-
bution, as is standard in Bayesian inference, implies a willingness to make definite predictions
about random variables that, some claim, one really knows nothing about. Disagreement on
1...yet some are useful, as famously remarked by Box (1979).
2When the single-vs. multiple-prior issue came up in a discussion on the decision-theory forum mailing
























this issue goes back at least to Keynes (1921) and Ramsey (1931), has led many economists to
sympathize with multiple-prior models (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) and some statisticians
to embrace the related imprecise probability (Walley, 1991, Augustin et al., 2014) in which
so-called ‘Knightian’ uncertainty is modeled by a set P∗ of distributions. But imprecise
probability is not without problems of its own, an important one being dilation (Example 1
below). Safe probability can be understood as starting from a set P∗, but then mapping the
set of distributions to a single distribution, where the mapping invoked may depend on the
prediction task at hand — thus avoiding both dilation and overly precise predictions. The
use of such mappings has been advocated before, under the name pignistic transformation
(Smets, 1989, Hampel, 2001), but a general theory for constructing and evaluating them has
been lacking (see also Section 5).
3. Fisher’s Biggest Blunder3 Fisher (1930) introduced fiducial inference, a method to
come up with a ‘posterior’ P̃ (θ | Xn) on a model’s parameter space based on data Xn, but
without anything like a ‘prior’, in an approach to statistics that was neither Bayesian nor
frequentist. The approach turned out problematic however, and, despite progress on related
structural inference (Fraser, 1968, 1979) was largely abandoned. Recently, however, fiducial
distributions have made a comeback (Hannig, 2009, Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2013, Martin
and Liu, 2013, Veronese and Melilli, 2015), in some instances with a more modest, frequentist
interpretation as confidence distributions (Schweder and Hjort, 2002, 2016). As noted by Xie
and Singh (2013), these ‘contain a wealth of information for inference’, e.g. to determine valid
confidence intervals and unbiased estimation of the median, but their interpretation remains
difficult, viz. the insistence by Hampel (2006), Xie and Singh (2013) and many others that,
although P̃ (· | Xn) is defined as a distribution on the parameter space, the parameter itself is
not random. Safe probability offers an alternative perspective, where the insistence that ‘θ is
not random’ is replaced by the weaker (and perhaps liberating) statement that ‘we can treat
θ as random’ as long as we restrict ourselves to safe inferences about it’ — in Section 3.1 we
determine precisely what these safe inferences are and how they fit into a general hierarchy:
4. The Hierarchy Pursuing the idea that some distributions are reliable for a smaller
subset of random variables/prediction tasks than others, leads to a natural hierarchy of
safeties — a first taste of which is in Figure 1 on page 5, with notations explained later. At
the top are distributions that are fully reliable for whatever task one has in mind; at the
bottom those that are reliable only for a single task in a weak, average sense. In between
there is a natural place for distributions that are calibrated (Example 2 below), that are
confidence–safe (i.e. valid confidence distributions) and that are optimal for squared-error
prediction.
5. “The concept of a conditional probability with regard to an isolated hypoth-
esis...4 Upon first hearing of the Monty Hall (quiz master, three doors) problem (vos
Savant, 1990, Gill, 2011), most people naively think that the probability of winning the car
is the same whether one switches doors or not. Most can eventually, after much arguing, be
3While Fisher is generally regarded as (one of) the greatest statisticians of all time, fiducial inference is
often considered to be his ‘big blunder’ — see Hampel (2006) and Efron (1996), who writes Maybe Fisher’s
biggest blunder will become a big hit in the 21st century!
4... whose probability equals 0 is inadmissible,” as remarked by Kolmogorov (1933). As will be seen, safe
probability suggests an even more radical statement related to the Monty Hall sanity check.
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convinced that this is wrong, but wouldn’t it be nice to have a simple sanity check that im-
mediately tells you that the naive answer must be wrong, without even pondering the ‘right’
way to approach the problem? Safe probability provides such a check: one can immediately
tell that the naive answer is not safe, and thus cannot be right. Such a check is applicable
more generally, whenever conditioning on events rather than on random variables (Example 4
and Section 4).
6. “Could Neyman, Jeffreys and Fisher have agreed on testing?5 Ryabko and
Monarev (2003) shows that sequences of 0s and 1s produced by standard random number
generators can be substantially compressed by standard data compression algorithms such
as rar or zip. While this is clear evidence that such sequences are not random, this method
is neither a valid Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test nor a valid Bayesian test (in the tradition
of Jeffreys). The reason is that both these standard paradigms require the existence of an
alternative statistical model, and start out by the assumption that, if the null model (i.i.d.
Bernoulli (1/2)) is incorrect, then the alternative must be correct. However, there is no clear
sense in which zip could be ‘correct’ — see Section 5. There is a third testing paradigm, due
to Fisher, which does view testing as accumulating evidence against h0, and not necessarily as
confirming some precisely specified h1. Yet Fisher’s paradigm is not without serious problems
either — see Section 5.
Berger et al. (1994) started a line of work culminating in Berger (2003), who presents
tests that have interpretations in all three paradigms and that avoid some of the problems
of their original implementations. However, it is essentially an objective Bayes approach and
thus inevitably, strong evidence against h0 implies a high posterior probability that h1 is true.
If one is really doing Fisherian testing, this is unwanted. Using the idea of safety, we can
extend Berger’s paradigm by stipulating the inferences for which we think it is safe: roughly
speaking, if we are in a Fisherian set-up, then we declare all inferences conditional on h1 to be
unsafe, and inferences conditional on h0 to be safe; if we really believe that h1 may represent
the state of the world, we can declare inferences conditional on h1 to be safe. But much more
is possible using safe probability — a DM can decide, on a case by case basis, what inferences
based on her tests would be safe, and under what situations the test results itself are safe —
for example, some tests remain safe under optional stopping, whereas others (even Bayesian
ones!) do not. While we will report on this application of safety (which comprises a long
paper in itself) elsewhere, we will briefly return to it in the conclusion.
7. Further Applications: Objective Bayes, Epistemic Probability Apart from the
applications above, the results in this paper suggest that safe probability be used to formalize
the status of default priors in objective Bayesian inferences, and to enable an alternative look
at epistemic probability. But this remains a topic for future work, to which we briefly return
at the end of the paper.
The Dream Imagine a world in which one would require any statistical analysis — whether
it be testing, prediction, regression, density estimation or anything else — to be accompanied
by a safety statement. Such a statement should list what inferences, the analysists think, can
be safely made based on the conclusion of the analysis, and in what formal ‘safety’ sense. Is
the alternative h1 really true even though h0 is found to be false? Is the suggested predictive
5...”, as asked by Jim Berger (2003).
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distribution valid or merely calibrated? Is the posterior really just good for making predictions
via the predictive distribution, or is it confidence-safe, or is it generally safe? Does the inferred
regression function only work well on covariates drawn randomly from the same distribution,
or also under covariate shift? (an application of safety we did not address here but which we
can easily incorporate). The present, initial formulation of safe probability is too complicated
to have any realistic hopes for a practice like this to emerge, but I can’t help hoping that the
ideas can be simplified substantially, and a safer practice of statistics might emerge.
Starting with Grünwald (1999), my own work — often in collaboration with J. Halpern — has
regularly used the idea of ‘safety’, for example in the context of Maximum Entropy inference
(Grünwald, 2000), and also dilation (Grünwald and Halpern, 2004), calibration (Grünwald
and Halpern, 2011), and probability puzzles like Monty Hall (Grünwald and Halpern, 2003,
Grünwald, 2013). However, the insights of earlier papers were very partial and scattered, and
the present paper presents for the first time a general formalism, definitions and a hierarchy.
It is also the first one to make a connection to confidence distributions and pivots.
1.1 Informal Overview
Below we explain the basic ideas using three recurring examples. We assume that we are
given a set of distributions P∗ on some space of outcomes Z. Under a frequentist interpreta-
tion, P∗ is the set of distributions that we regard as ‘potentially true’; under a subjectivist
interpretation, it is the credal set that describes our uncertainty or ‘beliefs’; all developments
below work under both interpretations.
All probability distributions mentioned below are either an element of P∗, or they are a
pragmatic distribution P̃ , which some decision-maker (DM) uses to predict the outcomes of
some variable U given the value of some other variable V ,where both U and V are random
quantities defined on Z. P̃ is also used to estimate the quality of such predictions. P̃ (which
may be, but is not always in P∗) is ‘pragmatic’ because we assume from the outset that some
element of P∗ might actually lead to better predictions — we just do not know which one.
Example 1 [Dilation] A DM has to make a prediction or decision about random variable
U ∈ U = {0, 1} given the value of V ∈ V = {0, 1}. She knows that the marginal probability
P (U = 1) = 0.9; she suspects that U may depend on V , but has no idea whether U and V
are positively or negatively correlated or how strong the correlation is. She may thus model
her uncertainty as the set P∗ of all distributions P on Z = U × V that satisfy
P (U = 1) =
∑
v∈V
P (U = 1, V = v) = 0.9. (1)
Given that V = 1, what should she predict for U? A standard answer in imprecise probability
(Walley, 1991) is to pointwise condition the set P∗, leading one to adopt the probabilities
P∗(U = 1 | V = 1) := {P (U = 1 | V = 1) : P ∈ P∗}. But this set contains every distribution
on U , including P (U = 1 | V = 1) = 0 (the latter would obtain for the P ∈ P∗ with
P (U = |1 − V |) = 1). It therefore seems that, after observing V = 1, the DM has lost
rather than gained information. By symmetry, the same happens after observing V = 0, so
whatever DM observes, she loses information — a phenomenon known as dilation (Seidenfeld
and Wasserman, 1993). This is intuitively disturbing, and it may perhaps be better to simply
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Figure 1: A Hierarchy of Relations for P̃ . The concepts on the right correspond (broadly) to existing
notions, whose name is given on the left (with the exception of U | 〈V 〉, for which no regular name
seems to exist). A → B means that safety of P̃ for A implies safety for B — at least, under some
conditions: for all solid arrows, this is proven under the assumption of V with countable range (see
underneath Proposition 1). For the dashed arrows, this is proven under additional conditions (see
Theorem 2 and subsequent remark). On the right are shown transformations on U under which safety
is preserved, e.g. if P̃ is calibrated for U |V then it is also calibrated for U ′ | V for every U ′ with
U  U ′ (see remark underneath Theorem 2). Weakening the conditions for the proofs and providing
more detailed interrelations is a major goal for future work, as well as investigating whether the
hierarchy has a natural place for causal notions, such as P̃ (U | do(v)) as in Pearl’s (2009) do-calculus.
ignore V and predict using the distribution that acts as if U ⊥ V and has
P̃ (U = 1 | V = v) = P (U = 1) for all v ∈ V, (2)
i.e. P̃ (U = 1 | V = v) = 0.9. While from a purely subjective Bayesian standpoint information
is never useless and this seems silly, it is certainly what humans often do in practice, and
usually, they get away with it (Dempster, 1968) — for concrete examples see Grünwald and
Halpern (2004). Here is where Safe Probability comes in — it tells us that P̃ is safe to use,
in the following simple sense: for any function g : U → R, we have:
for all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ V: EU∼P [g(U)] = EU∼P̃ [g(U) | V = v]. (3)
In particular, if we have a loss function L : U × A → R mapping outcomes and actions to
associated losses, then, for any action a ∈ A, we can plug in g(U) := L(U, a) above and then
we find that (assuming P∗ contains the truth):
DM’s predictions are guaranteed to be exactly as good, in expectation, as she
would expect them to be if P̃ were actually ‘true’ — even if P̃ is not true at all.
We immediately add though that if we had a loss function L′ : U × V ×A → R which would
itself depend on V (e.g. if V = 1 DM is offered a different bet on U than if V = 0) then
the P̃ based on ignoring V is not safe any more — (3) may not hold any more, and the
actual expectation may be different from DM’s. In terms of the formalism we develop below
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(Definition 1, 2 and 3), this will be expressed as ‘P̃ is safe for predicting with loss function
L but not loss function L′’, or, in formal notation, P̃ is safe for L(·, a) | [V ] but not for
L′(·, a) | [V ]. The intuitive meaning is that DM can safely use P̃ to make predictions against
L (her predictions will be as good as she expects) but not against L′. These statements will
be immediate consequences of the more general statements ‘P̃ is safe for U | [V ] but not safe
for U | V ’.
In some cases, we will not be able to come up with a P̃ satisfying (3), and we have to
settle for a P̃ that satisfies a weaker notion of safety, such as, for all P ∈ P∗, all functions g,
EV∼P
[
EU∼P̃ [g(U) | V ]
]
= EU∼P [g(U)], (4)
which says that DM predicts as well on average as DM would expect to predict on average if
P̃ were true, even though P̃ may not be true. This will be denoted as ‘P̃ is safe for U | 〈V 〉’;
and if (4) only holds for g the identity (which makes no difference if |U| = 2, but in general
it does) we have the even weaker safety for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 (Figure 1). In Section 2.2 we thus
obtain five basic notions of safety, varying from weak safety, in an average sense, to very
strong safety, safety for U | V , which essentially means that P̃ (U | V ) must be the correct
conditional distribution.
In this example we used frequentist terminology, such as ‘correct’ and ‘true’, and we continue
to do so in this paper. Still, a subjective interpretation remains valid in this and future
examples as well: if the DM’s real beliefs are given by the full set P∗, she can safely act as
if her belief is represented by the singleton P̃ as long as she also believes that her loss does
not depend on V .
Example 2 [Calibration] Consider the weather forecaster on your local television station.
Every night the forecaster makes a prediction about whether or not it will rain the next
day in the area where you live. She does this by asserting that the probability of rain is
p, where p ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1}. How should we interpret these probabilities? The usual
interpretation is that, in the long run, on those days at which the weather forecaster predict
probability p, it will rain approximately 100p% of the time. Thus, for example, among
all days for which she predicted 0.1, the fraction of days with rain was close to 0.1. A
weather forecaster (DM) with this property is said to be calibrated (Dawid, 1982, Foster
and Vohra, 1998). Like safety itself, calibration is a minimal requirement: for example, a
weather forecaster who predicts, each day of the year, that the probability of rain tomorrow
is 50% will be approximately calibrated in the Netherlands, but her predictions are not very
useful — and it is easily seen that, when using a proper scoring rule, optimal forecasts are
calibrated, but calibrated forecasts can be far from optimal. On the other hand, in practice
we often see calibrated weather forecasters that predict well, but do not predict with anything
close to the ‘truth’ — their predictions depend on high-dimensional covariates consisting of
measurements of air pressure, temperature etc. at numerous locations in the world, and
it seems quite unlikely (and, for practical purposes, unnecessary!) that, given any specific
values of these covariates, they issue the correct conditional distribution. While calibration
is usually defined relative to empirical data, a re-definition in terms of an underlying set of
distributions P∗ is straightforward (Vovk et al., 2005, Grünwald and Halpern, 2011), and in
Section 2.3 we show that the probabilistic definition of calibration has a natural expression
in terms of the safety notions introduced above: P̃ (U | V ) is calibrated for U if it is safe for
U | [V ], V ′, for some V ′ with V  V ′ (all notation to be explained) — which implies that
(3) is itself an instance of calibration.
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Example 3 [Bayesian, Fiducial and Confidence Distributions] We are given a para-
metric probability model M = {qθ | θ ∈ Θ} where Θ ⊆ Rk for some k ≥ 1, each qθ defines
a probability density or mass function on data (X1, . . . , XN ) = X
N of sample size N , each
outcome Xi taking a value in some space X . The goal is to make inferences about θ, based
on the data XN or some statistic S(XN , N) thereof. In the common case with fixed N = n
and inference based on the full data, S(XN , N) := Xn, we can transfer this statistical sce-
nario to our setup by defining P∗ as a set of distributions on Z = Θ × X n. RVs U and
V = S(Xn, n) = Xn are then defined as, for each z = (θ, xn), U(z) := θ and V (z) := xn. DM
employs a set Π of prior distributions on Θ, where each π ∈ Π induces a joint distribution
Pπ on Θ × X n with marginal on Θ determined by π and, given θ, density of xn given by
qθ, so that if π has density pπ, we get the joint density pπ(θ, x
n) = pπ(θ) · qθ(xn). We set
P∗ := {Pπ : π ∈ Π} to be the set of all such joint distributions. In the special case in which
DM really is a 100% subjective Bayesian who believes that a single prior π captures all un-
certainty, we have that P∗ = {Pπ} contains just a single joint parameter-data distribution,
and we are in the standard Bayesian scenario. Then DM can set P̃ (θ | Xn) := Pπ(θ | Xn),
the standard posterior, and any type of inference about θ is safe relative to P∗. Here we
focus on another special case, in which Π contains exactly one density for each θ ∈ Θ, namely
the degenerate distribution putting all its mass on θ. We denote this distribution by Pθ and
notice that then P∗ = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, with Pθ(Θ = θ) = 1, and for any measurable set A,
Pθ(X
n ∈ A) determined by density pθ, satisfying
pθ(x
n) = pθ(x
n | Θ = θ) = qθ(xn).
Still, any choice of pragmatic distribution P̃ (U | V ) = P̃ (θ | Xn) can be interpreted as a
distribution on U ≡ Θ given the data Xn, analogous to a Bayesian posterior. In Section 3
we investigate how one can construct distributions P̃ of this kind that are safe for inference
about confidence intervals. for simplicity we restrict ourselves to the 1-dimensional case, for
which we find that the construction we provide leads to P̃ that are confidence-safe, written
in our notation as ‘safe for F̃ (U |V ) | [V ]’, with F̃ being the CDF (cumulative distribution
function) of P̃ (U |V ). Confidence safety is roughly the same as coverage Sweeting (2001): it
means that the ‘true’ probability that θ is contained in a particular type of α-credible sets
(sets with ‘posterior’ probability α given the data V ), is equal to α.
The P̃ we construct are essentially equivalent to the confidence distributions of (Schweder
and Hjort, 2002), that were designed with the explicit goal of having good confidence prop-
erties; they also often coincide with Fisher’s 1930 fiducial distributions, which in later work
(Fisher, 1935) he started treating as ordinary probability distributions that could be used
without any restrictions. This cannot be right (see e.g. (Hampel, 2006, page 514)), but the
question has always remained how a probability calculus for fiducial distributions could be
derived that incorporates the right restrictions. Our work provides a step in this direction,
in that we show how such P̃ snugly fit into our general framework: confidence safety is a
strictly weaker property than calibration, and has again a natural representation in terms of
the 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 notation mentioned above. Moreover, it is a special case of pivotal safety which
also has repercussions in quite different contexts — see Example 4.
The example illustrates two important points:
1. In some cases the literature suggests some method for constructing a pragmatic P̃ . An
example is the latent Dirichlet allocation model (Blei et al., 2003) mentioned above, in
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which data V are text corpora, P∗, not explicitly given, is a complicated set of realistic
distributions over V under which data are non-i.i.d., and the literature suggests to take
P̃ (U | V ) as the Bayesian posterior for a cleverly designed i.i.d. model.
2. In other cases, DM may want to construct a P̃ herself. In Example 1, the safe P̃ was
obtained by replacing an (unknown) conditional distribution with a (known) marginal
— a special case of what was called C-conditioning by Grünwald and Halpern (2011).
Marginal distributions and distributions that ignore aspects of V play a more central
role in this construction process: they also do in the confidence construction mentioned
above, where one sets P̃ (U | V ) equal to a distribution such that P̃ (U ′ | V ), where U ′ is
some auxiliary random variable (a pivot), becomes independent of V . For the original
RV U though, in the dilation example, DM acts as if U and V are independent even
though they may not be; in the confidence distribution example, DM acts in a ‘dual’
manner, namely as if U and V are dependent, even though under P∗ they are not —
which is fine, as long as her conclusions are safe.
Example 4 [Event-Based Conditioning and Pivotal Safety via Monty Hall] More
generally, we may look at safety for pragmatic distributions P̃ that condition on events rather
than random variables. To illustrate, consider the Monty Hall Problem (vos Savant, 1990,
Gill, 2011): suppose that you’re on a game show and given a choice of three doors {1, 2, 3}
Behind one is a car; behind the others are goats. You pick door 1. Before opening door 1,
Monty Hall, the host opens one of the other two doors, say, door 3 which has a goat. He
then asks you if you still want to take what’s behind door 1, or to take what’s behind door
2 instead. Should you switch? You may assume that initially, the car was equally likely
to be behind each of the doors and that, after you go to door 1, Monty will always open a
door with a goat behind. Basically you observe either the event {1, 3} (if Monty opens door
2) or {1, 2} (if Monty opens 3). You can then calculate your optimal decision according to
some distribution P̃ ({1} | E), where E ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 2}} is the event you observed. Naive
conditioning suggests to take P ({1} | {1, 2}) = P ({1} | {1, 3}) = (1/3)/(2/3) = 1/2, and it
takes a long time to convince most people that this is wrong — but, if DM’s would adhere
to safe probability, then no convincing and explanation would be needed: translation of the
example into our ‘safety’ setting immediately shows, without any further thinking about the
problem, that this choice of P̃ is unsafe, under all notions of safety we consider! (Section 4).
Another aspect of the Monty Hall problem is that, in most analyses that are usually
viewed as ‘correct’, one implicitly assumes that the quiz master flips a fair coin to decide
whether to open door 2 or 3 if you choose door 1 so that he has a choice. There have been
heated discussions (e.g. on wikipedia talk pages) about whether this assumption is justified.
In Example 11 we show that the P̃ which assumes a fair coin flip by Monty is an instance of a
pivotally safe pragmatic distribution. These have the properties that for many loss functions
(including 0/1-loss as in Monty Hall), they lead one to making optimal decisions. Thus, while
assuming a fair coin flip may be wrong, it is still harmless to base one’s decisions upon it.
Overview of the Paper In Section 2, we treat the case of countable space Z, defining
the basic notions of safety in Section 2.2 (where we return to dilation), and showing how
calibration can be cleanly expressed using our notions in Section 2.3. In Section 3 we extend
the setting to general Z, which is needed to handle the case of confidence safety (Section 3.1),
pivots (Section 3.2) and squared error optimality, where we observe continuous-valued random
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variables. Section 4 briefly discusses non-numerical observations as well as probability updates
that cannot be viewed as conditional distributions. We end with a discussion of further
potential applications of safety as well as open problems. Proofs and further technical details
are delegated to the appendix.
2 Basic Definitions for Discrete Random Variables
For simplicity, we introduce our basic notions only considering countable Z, which allows us
to sidestep measurability issues altogether. Thus below, Z is countable; we treat the general
case in Section 3.
2.1 Concepts and notations regarding distributions on Z
We define a random variable (abbreviated to RV) to be any function X : Z → Rk for some
k > 0. Thus RVs can be multidimensional (i.e. what is usually called ‘random vector’). By
an ‘Y-valued RV’ or simply ‘generalized RV’ we mean any function mapping Z to an arbitrary
set Y. For two RVs U = (U1, . . . , Uk1), V = (V1, . . . , Vk2) where Uj and Vj are 1-dimensional
random variables, we define (U, V ) to be the RV with components (U1, . . . , Uk1 , V1, . . . , Vk2).
For any generalized RVs U and V on Z and function f we write U f V if for all z ∈ Z,
V (z) = f(U(z)). We write U  V (“U determines V ”, or equivalently “U is a coarsening
of V ”) if there is a function f such that U
f
 V . We write U ! V if U  V and
V  U . For two GRVs U and V we write U ≡ V if they define the same function on Z,
and for a distribution P ∈ Z we write U=PV if P (U = V ) = 1. We write U
f
 P V if
P ({z ∈ Z : V (z) = f(U(z))}) = 1, and U  P V if there exists some f for which this holds.
Clearly U  V implies that for all distributions P on Z, U  P V , but not vice versa. Let
S : Z → S be a function on Z. The range of S, denoted range(S), the support of S under
a distribution P , and the range of S given that another function T on Z takes value t, are
denoted as
range(S) := {s ∈ S : s = S(z) for some z ∈ Z} ; suppP (S) := {s ∈ S : P (S = s) > 0},
range(S | T = t) = {s ∈ S : s = S(z) for some z ∈ Z with t = T (z)} (5)
where we note that suppP (S) ⊆ range(S), with equality if S has full support.
For a distribution P on Z, and U-valued RV U , we write P (U) as short-hand to denote
the distribution of U under P (i.e. P (U) is a probability measure).
We generally omit double brackets, i.e. if we write P (U,W ) for RVs U and W , we really
mean P (R) where R is the RV (U,W ),
Any generalized RV that maps all z ∈ Z to the same constant is called trivial, in particular
the RV 0 which maps all z ∈ Z to 0. For an event E ⊂ Z, we define the indicator random
variable 1E to be 1 if E holds and 0 otherwise.
Conditional Distributions as Generalized RVs For given distribution on Z and gen-
eralized RVs V and W , we denote, for all v ∈ suppP (V ), P | V = v as the conditional
distribution on Z given V = v, in the standard manner. We further define (P∗ |W = w) :=
{(P | W = w) : P ∈ P∗, w ∈ suppP (W )} to be the set of distributions on Z that can be
arrived at from P by conditioning on W = w, for all w supported by some P ∈ Z.
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We further denote, for all v ∈ suppP (V ), P (U | V = v) as the conditional distribution
of U given V = v, defined as the distribution on U given by P (U = u | V = v) := P (U =
u, V = v)/P (V = v) (whereas P | V = v is defined as a distribution on Z, P (U | V = v) is a
distribution on the more restricted space range(U)).
Suppose DM is interested in predicting RV U given RV V and does this using some
conditional distribution P (U | V = v) (usually this P will be the ‘pragmatic’ P̃ , but the
definition that follows holds generally). Adopting the standard convention for conditional
expectation, we call any function from range(V ) to the set of distributions on U that
coincides with P (U | V = v) for all v ∈ suppP (V ) a version of the conditional distribution
P (U | V ). If we make a statement of the form ‘P (U | V ) satisfies ...’, we really mean ‘every
version of P (U | V ) satisfies...’. We thus treat P (U | V ) as a E-valued random variable
where E = {P (U | V = v) : v ∈ range(V )}, where, for all z ∈ Z with P (V = V (z)) > 0,
P (U | V )(z) := P (U | V = V (z)), and P (U | V )(z) set to an arbitrary value otherwise.
Unique and Well-Definedness Recall that DM starts with a set P∗ of distributions on
Z that she considers the right description of her uncertainty. She will predict sume RV U
given some generalized RV V using a pragmatic distribution P̃ .
For RV U : Z → Rk and generalized RV V , we say that, for given distribution P ′ on
Z, P ′(U | V ) is essentially uniquely defined (relative to P∗) if for all P ∈ P∗, suppP (V ) ⊆
suppP ′(V ) (so that P -almost surely V takes value v with P
′(V = v) > 0). We use this
definition both for P ′ ∈ P∗ and for P ′ = P̃ ; note that we always evaluate whether P ′ is
uniquely defined under distributions in the ‘true’ P∗ though.
We say that EP ′ [U | V ] is well-defined if, writing U = (U1, . . . , Uk), and, U+j = max{Uj , 0},
U−j = max{−Uj , 0}, we have, for j = 1..k, either EP ′ [U
+
j | V ] < ∞ with P -probability 1,
or EP ′ [U
−
j | V ] < ∞ with P -probability 1. This is a very weak requirement that ensures
that calculating expectations never involves the operation ∞−∞, making all expectations
well-defined.
The Pragmatic Distribution P̃ We assume that DM makes her predictions based on a
probability distribution P̃ on Z which we generally refer to as the pragmatic distribution. In
practice, DM will usually be presented with a decision problem in which she has to predict
some fixed RV U based on some fixed RV V , and then she is only interested in the conditional
distribution P̃ (U | V ), and for some other RVs U ′ and V ′, P̃ (U ′ | V ′) may be left undefined.
In other cases she only may want to predict the expectation of U given V — in that case she
only needs to specify EP̃ [U | V ] as a function of V , and all other details of P̃ may be left
unspecified. In Appendix A.1 we explain how to deal with such partially specified P̃ . In the
main text though, for simplicity we assume that P̃ is a fully-specified distribution on Z; DM
can fill up irrelevant details any way she likes. The very goal of our paper being to restrict
P̃ to making ‘safe’ predictions however, DM may come up with P̃ to predict U given V and
there may be many RVs U ′ and V ′ definable on the domain such that P̃ (U ′ | V ′) has no
bearing to P∗ and would lead to terrible predictions; as long as we make sure that P̃ is not
used for such U ′ and V ′ — which we will — this will not harm the DM.
2.2 The Basic Notions of Safety
All our subsequent notions of ‘safety’ will be constructed in terms of the following first, simple
definitions.
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Definition 1 Let Z be an outcome space and P∗ be a set of distributions on Z, let U be an
RV and V be a generalized RV on Z, and let P̃ be a distribution on Z. We say that P̃ is
safe for 〈U〉 | JV K (pronounced as ‘P̃ is safe for predicting 〈U〉 given JV K’), if
for all P ∈ P∗ : inf
v∈suppP̃ (V )
EP̃ [U |V = v] ≤ EP [U ] ≤ sup
v∈suppP̃ (V )
EP̃ [U |V = v]. (6)
We say that P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, if
for all P ∈ P∗ : EP [U ] = EP [EP̃ [U |V ]]. (7)
We say that P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | [V ], if (6) holds with both inequalities replaced by an equality,
i.e. for all v ∈ suppP̃ (V ),
for all P ∈ P∗ : EP [U ] = EP̃ [U |V = v]. (8)
In this definition, as in all definitions and results to come, whenever we write ‘〈 statement 〉’
we really mean ‘all conditional probabilities in the following statement are essentially uniquely
defined, all expectations are well-defined, and 〈 statement 〉’. Hence, (7) really means ‘for
all P ∈ P∗, P̃ (U |V ) is essentially uniquely defined, EP̃ [U |V ], EP [U ], and EP [EP̃ [U |V ]] are
well-defined, and the latter two are equal to each other’. Also, when we wrote P̃ is safe for
〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, we really meant that it is safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 relative to the given P∗; we will in
general leave out the phrase ‘relative to P∗’, whenever this cannot cause confusion.
To be fully clear about notation, note that in double expectations like in (7), we consider
the right random variable to be bound by the outer expectation; thus it can be rewritten in
any of the following ways:
EU∼P [U ] = EV∼PEU∼P̃ |V [U ]
EV∼PEU∼P |V [U ] = EV∼PEU∼P̃ |V [U ]∑
u∈range(U)
P (U = u) · u =
∑
v∈range(V )
P (V = v) ·
∑
u∈range(U)
P̃ (U = u | V = v) · u,
where the second equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectation.
Towards a Hierarchy It is immediately seen that, if P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | [V ], then it is
also safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, and if it is safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, then it is also safe for 〈U〉 | JV K.
Safety for 〈U〉 | JV K is thus the weakest notion — it allows a DM to give valid upper- and
lower-bounds on the actual expectation of U , by quoting supv∈suppP̃ (V ) EP̃ [U | V = v] and
infv∈suppP̃ (V ) EP̃ [U | V = v], respectively, but nothing more. It will hardly be used here,
except for a remark below Theorem 2; it plays an important role though in applications of
safety to hypothesis testing, on which we will report in future work.
Safety for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 evidently bears relations to unbiased estimation: if P̃ is safe for
〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, i.e. (7) holds, then we can think of EP̃ [U |V ] as an unbiased estimate, based on
observing V , of the random quantity U (see also Example 8 later on). Safety for 〈U〉 | [V ]
implies that all distributions in P∗ agree on the expectation of U and that EP̃ [U | V = v] is
the same for (essentially) all values of v, and is thus a much stronger notion.
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Example 5 [Dilation: Example 1, Cont.] The first application of definition (7) was
already given in Example 1, where we used a P̃ that ignored V and was safe for 〈U〉 |
〈V 〉 and 〈U〉 | [V ], as we see from (4) with g the identity. Let us extend the example,
replacing U = {0, 1} in that example by U = {0, 1, 2}, with P∗ again defined as the set of
all distributions satisfying (1) and P̃ defined by, for v ∈ {0, 1}, P̃ (U = 1 | V = v) = 0.9,
P̃ (U = 2 | V = v) = 0.09. Then P̃ would still be safe for 〈1U=1〉 | 〈V 〉, but not for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉:
P∗ contains a distribution whose marginal distribution P (U = 2) = 0, and (7) would not
hold for that distribution.
Comparing the ‘safety condition’ (4) in Example 1 to (7) in Definition 1 we see that Defini-
tion 1 only imposes a requirement on expectations of U whereas (4) imposed a requirement
also on RVs U ′ equal to functions g(U) of U . For U with more than two elements as in
Example 5 above, such a requirement is strictly stronger. We now proceed to define this
stronger notion formally.
Definition 2 Let Z,P∗, U, V and P̃ be as above. We say that P̃ is safe for U | JV K if for
all RVs U ′ with U  U ′, P̃ is safe for 〈U ′〉 | JV K.
Similarly, P̃ is safe for U | 〈V 〉 if for all RVs U ′ with U  U ′, P̃ is safe for 〈U ′〉 | 〈V 〉, and
P̃ is safe for U | [V ] if for all RVs U ′ with U  U ′, P̃ is safe for 〈U ′〉 | [V ].
We see that safety of P̃ for U | [V ] implies that EP̃ [g(U) | V = v] is the same for all values
of v in the support of P̃ , and all functions g of U . This can only be the case if P̃ (U | V )
ignores V , i.e. P̃ (U | V = v) = P̃ (U), for all supported v. We must then also have that, for
all v ∈ suppP̃ (V ), that P̃ (U) = P (U), which means that all distributions in P
∗ agree on the
marginal distribution of U , and P̃ (U) is equal to this marginal distribution. Thus, P̃ is safe
for U | [V ] iff it is marginally valid. A prime example of such a P̃ (U | V ) that ignores V and
is marginally correct is the P̃ (U | V ) we encountered in Example 1.
To get everything in place, we need a final definition.
Definition 3 Let Z,P∗, U, V and P̃ be as above, and let W be another generalized RV.
1. We say that P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | JV K,W if for all w ∈ suppP̃ (W ), P̃ |W = w is safe for
〈U〉 | JV K relative to P∗ | W = w. We say that P̃ is safe for U | JV K,W if for all RVs
U ′ with U  U ′, P̃ is safe for 〈U ′〉 | JV K,W .
2. The same definitions apply with JV K replaced by 〈V 〉 and [V ].
3. We say that P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | W if it is safe for 〈U〉 | J0K,W ; it is safe for U | W if
it is safe for U | J0K,W .
These definitions simply say that safety for ‘..|..,W ’ means that the space Z can be partitioned
according to the value taken by W , and that for each element of the partition (indexed by
w) one has ‘local’ safety given that one is in that element of the partition.
Proposition 1 gives reinterpretations of some of the notions above. The first one, (9) will
mostly be useful for the proof of other results; the other three serve to make the original
definitions more transparent:
Proposition 1 [Basic Interpretations of Safety] Consider the setting above. We have:
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1. P̃ is safe for U | 〈V 〉 iff for all P ∈ P∗, there exists a distribution P ′ on Z with for
all (u, v) ∈ range((U, V )), P ′(U = u, V = v) = P̃ (U = u | V = v) · P (V = v), that
satisfies
P ′(U) = P (U). (9)
2. P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | V iff for all P ∈ P∗,
EP [U | V ] =P EP̃ [U | V ]. (10)
3. P̃ is safe for U | V iff for all P ∈ P∗,
P (U | V ) =P P̃ (U | V ). (11)
4. P̃ is safe for U | [V ],W iff for all P ∈ P∗,
P (U |W ) =P P̃ (U | V,W ). (12)
Together with the preceding definitions, this proposition establishes the arrows in Figure 1
from U | V to 〈U〉 | V , from 〈U〉 | V to 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 and from U | 〈V 〉 to 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉. The
remaining arrows will be established by Theorem 1 and 2.
Note that (12) says that P̃ is safe for U | [V ],W if P̃ ignores V given W , i.e. according
to P̃ , U is conditionally independent of V given W . Thus, P̃ can be safe for U | [V ],W and
still P̃ (U | V ) may depend on V ; the definition only requires that V is ignored once W is
given.
(11) effectively expresses that P̃ (U | V ) is valid (a frequentist might say ‘true’) for pre-
dicting U based on observing V , where as always we assume that P∗ itself correctly describes
our beliefs or potential truths (in particular, if P∗ = {P} is a singleton, then any P̃ (U | V )
which coincides a.s. with P (U | V ) is automatically valid). Thus, ‘validity for U | V ’, to be
interpreted as P̃ is a valid distribution to use when predicting U given observations of V is a
natural name for safety for U | V . We also have a natural name for safety for 〈U〉 | V : for
1-dimensional U , (10) simply expresses that all distributions in P∗ agree on the conditional
expectation of U | V , and that EP̃ [U | V ] is a version of it. which implies (see e.g. Williams
(1991)) that, with the function g(v) := EP̃ [U | V = v],
E(U,V )∼P [(U − g(V ))2] = min
f
E(U,V )∼P [(U − f(V ))2], (13)
the minimum being taken over all functions from range(V ) to R. This means that P̃ encodes
the optimal regression function for U given V and hence suggests the name squared-error
optimality. Summarizing the names we encountered (see Figure 1):
Definition 4 [(Potential) Validity, Squared Error-Optimality, Unbiasedness, Marginal
Validity] If P̃ is safe for U | V , i.e. (11) holds for all P ∈ P∗, then we also call P̃ valid
for U | V (again, pronounce as ‘valid for predicting U given V ’). If (11) holds for some
P ∈ P∗, we call P̃ potentially valid for U | V . If P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | V , we call P̃ squared
error-optimal for U | V . If P̃ is safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉, we call P̃ unbiased for U | V . If P̃ is
safe for 〈U〉 | [V ], we say that it is marginally valid for U | V .
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It turns out that there also is a natural name for safety for U | [V ],W whenever V  W .
The next example reiterates its importance, and the next section will provide the name:
calibration.
Example 6 Suppose P̃ is safe for U | [V1], V2. From Proposition 1, (12) we see that this
means that for all P ∈ P∗, all v1, v2 ∈ suppP (V1, V2), that
EP [U
′ | V2 = v2] = EP̃ [U
′ | V1 = v1, V2 = v2], (14)
The special case with V2 ≡ 0 has already been encountered in Example 1, (3). As discussed
in that example, for V2 ≡ 0, (14) expresses our basic interpretation of safety that predictions
based on P̃ will always be as good, in expectation, as the DM who uses P̃ expects them to be.
Clearly this continues to be the case if (14) holds for some nontrivial V2.
2.3 Calibration Safety
In this section, we show that calibration, as informally defined in Example 2, has a natural
formulation in terms of our safety notions. We first define calibration formally, and then,
in our first main result, Theorem 1, show how being calibrated for predicting U based on
observing V is essentially equivalent to being safe for U | [V ], V ′ for some types of V ′ that
need not be equal to V itself, including V ′ ≡ 0. Thus, we now effectively unify the ideas
underlying Example 1 (dilation) and Example 2 (calibration).
Following Grünwald and Halpern (2011) we define calibration directly in terms of distri-
butions rather than empirical data, in the following way:
Definition 5 [Calibration] Let Z, P∗, U , V and P̃ be as above. We say that P̃ is
calibrated (or calibration–safe) for 〈U〉 | V if for all P ∈ P∗, all µ ∈ {EP̃ [U | V = v] : v ∈
suppP (V )},
EP [U | EP̃ [U | V ] = µ ] = µ. (15)
We say that P̃ is calibrated for U | V if for all P ∈ P∗, all p ∈ {P̃ (U | V = v) : v ∈
suppP (V )},
P (U | P̃ (U | V ) = p ) = p (16)
Hence, calibration (for U) means that given that a DM who uses P̃ predicts a specific distri-
bution for U , the actual distribution is indeed equal to the predicted distribution. Note that
here we once again treat P̃ (U | V ) as a generalized RV.
In practice we would want to weaken Definition 5 to allow some slack, requiring the µ
(viz. p) inside the conditioning to be only within some ε > 0 of the µ (viz. p) outside, but the
present idealized definition is sufficient for our purposes here. Note also that the definition
refers to a simple form of calibration, which does not involve selection rules based on past
data such as used by, e.g., Dawid (1982).
We now express calibration in terms of our safety notions. We will only do this for the
‘full distribution’–version (16); a similar result can be established for the average-version.
Theorem 1 Let U, V and P̃ be as above. The following three statements are equivalent:
1. P̃ is calibrated for U | V ;
2. There exists a RV V ′ on Z with V  P̃ V
′ such that P̃ is safe for U | [V ], V ′
14
3. P̃ is safe for U | V ′′ where V ′′ is the generalized RV given by V ′′ ≡ P̃ (U | V ).
Note that, since safety for U | V implies safety for U | [V ], V ′ for V ′ = V , (2.) ⇒ (1.)
shows that safety for U | V implies calibration for U | V . By mere definition chasing
(details omitted) one also finds that (2.) implies that P̃ is safe for U | 〈V 〉, V ′ and, again by
definition chasing, that P̃ is safe for U | 〈V 〉. Thus, this result establishes two more arrows
of the hierarchy of Figure 1. Its proof is based on the following simple result, interesting in
its own right:
Proposition 2 Let V and V ′ be generalized RVs such that V
f
 P̃ V
′ for some function f .
The following statements are equivalent:
1. P̃ (U | V, V ′) ignores V , i.e. P̃ (U | V, V ′) =P̃ P̃ (U | V
′).
2. For all v′ ∈ suppP̃ (V
′), for all v ∈ suppP̃ (V ) with f(v) = v
′: P̃ (U | V = v) = P (U |
V ′ = v′).
3. V ′  P̃ P̃ (U | V )
4. V ′  P̃ V
′′ and P̃ (U | V ′, V ′′) ignores V ′, where V ′′ = P̃ (U | V ).
Moreover, if P̃ is safe for U | V and P̃ (U | V, V ′) ignores V , then P̃ is safe for U | V ′.
3 Continuous-Valued U and V ; Confidence and Pivotal Safety
Our definitions of safety were given for countable Z, making all random variables involved
have countable range as well. Now we allow general Z and hence continuous-valued U and
general uncountable V as well, but we consider a version of safety in which we do not have
safety for U | V itself, but for U ′ | V for some U ′ with (U, V )  U ′ such that the range of
P̃[V ](U ′) := {P̃ (U ′ | V = v) : v ∈ range(V )} is still countable. To make this work we have
to equip Z with an appropriate σ-algebra ΣZ and have to add to the definition of a RV that
it must be measurable,6 and we have to modify the definition of support suppP (U) to the
standard measure-theoretic definition (which specializes to our definition (5) whenever there
exists a countable U such that P (U ∈ U) = 1). Yet nothing else changes and all previous
definitions and propositions can still be used.7
Additional Notations and Assumptions In this section we frequently refer to (cumu-
lative) distribution functions of 1-dimensional RVs, for which we introduce some notation:
for distribution P ∈ P∗ and RV W : Z → R, let F[W ](·) denote the distribution function
of W , i.e. F[W ](w) = P (W ≤ w). The notation is extended to conditional distribution
functions: for given P̃ (U | V ), we let F̃[U |V ](u|v) := P̃ (U ≤ u | V = v). The subscripts [W ]
and [U |V ] indicate the RVs under consideration; we will omit them if they are clear from
6Formally we assume that Z is equipped with some σ-algebra ΣZ that contains all singleton subsets of Z.
We associate the co-domain of any function X : Z → Rk with the standard Borel σ-algebra on Rk, and we
call such X an RV whenever the σ-algebra ΣZ on Z is such that the function is measurable.
7If we were to consider safety of the form U | V for uncountable P̃[V ](U), then this set of probability
distributions would have to be equipped with a topology, which is a bit more complicated and is left for future
work.
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the context. Note that we can consider these distribution functions as RVs: for all z ∈ Z,
F[W ](W )(z) = P (W ≤W (z)) and F̃[U |V ](U |V )(z) = P̃ (U ≤ U(z) | V = V (z)).
Since this greatly simplifies matters, we will often assume that either P ∈ P∗ or P̃ (U | V )
satisfy the following:
Scalar Density Assumption A distribution P (U) for RV U satisfies the scalar den-
sity assumption if (a) range(U) ⊆ R is equal to some (possibly unbounded) interval, and
(b) P has a density f relative to Lebesgue measure with f(u) > 0 for all u in the inte-
rior of range(U). We say that P (U |V ) satisfies the scalar density assumption if for all
v ∈ range(V ), P (U | V = v) satisfies it.
This is a strong assumption which will nevertheless be satisfied in many practical cases.
For example, normal distributions, gamma distributions with fixed shape parameter, beta
distributions etc. all satisfy it.
Overview of this Section The goal of the following two subsections is to precisely re-
formulate the fiducial and confidence distributions that have been proposed in the statis-
tical literature as pragmatic distributions in our sense, that can be safely used for some
(‘confidence-related’) but not for other prediction tasks. Here we focus on the standard sta-
tistical scenario introduced in Example 3. The underlying idea of ‘pivotal safety’ (developed
in Section 3.2) has applications in discrete, nonstatistical settings as well, as explored in
Section 3.3.
3.1 Confidence Safety
We start with a classic motivating example.
Example 7 [Example 3, Specialized] As a special case of the statistical scenario outlined
in Example 3, let M be the normal location family with varying mean θ and fixed variance,
say σ2 = 1, and let V := θ̂ = θ̂(Xn) where θ̂(Xn) is the empirical average of the Xi, which is
a sufficient statistic that is of course also equal to the ML estimator for data Xn. Then the
sampling density of θ̂ is itself Gaussian, and given by




In this simple context, Fisher’s controversial fiducial reasoning amounts to observing that (17)
is symmetric in θ̂ and θ; thus, if we simply define a new function p̃(θ | θ̂) := p(θ̂ | θ), then
this function must, for each fixed θ̂, be the density of a probability distribution (the integral
over θ must by symmetry be 1); and this would then amount to something like a ‘prior–
free’ posterior for θ based on data θ̂. In this special case, as well as with the corresponding
inversion for scale families, it coincides with the Bayes posterior based on an improper Jeffreys’
prior. Yet, Lindley (1958) showed that the general construction for 1-dimensional families,
which we review in the next subsection, cannot correspond to a Bayesian posterior except
for location and scale families: for different sample sizes, the ‘fiducial’ posterior for data of
size n corresponds to the Bayes posterior for a prior which depends on n.
Fisher (1930) noted that p̃ as constructed above lead to valid inference about confidence
intervals. Later (Fisher, 1935) he made claims that p̃ could be used for general prior-free
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inference about θ given data/statistic θ̂. This is not correct though, and more recently, p̃ is
more often regarded as an instance of a confidence distribution (Schweder and Hjort, 2002),
a term going back to Cox (1958) — these are by and large the same objects as fiducial
distributions, though with a stipulation that they only be used for certain inferences related
to confidence. In the remainder of this subsection, we develop a variation of safety that can
capture such confidence statements. In the next subsection, we review the general method for
designing confidence distributions for 1-dimensional statistical families and we shall see that,
under an additional condition, they are indeed confidence–safe in our sense. In the remainder
of this section, we focus on 1-dimensional families and interpret the RVs U and V as in our
statistical application of Example 3 and 7. Thus, U ≡ θ would be a 1-dimensional scalar
parameter of some model {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, V ≡ S(Xn) would be a statistic of the observed data.
In Example 7, V ≡ θ̂(Xn) is the ML estimator.
We are thus interested in constructing, for each v ∈ range(V ), an interval of R that has
(say) 95% probability under P̃ (U | V = v). To this end, we define for each v ∈ range(V ),
an interval Cv = [uv, ūv] where uv is such that F̃[U |V ](uv | v) = 0.025 and ūv is such that
F̃[U |V ](ūv | v) = 0.975. This set obviously has 95% probability according to P̃ (U | V = v). In
our interpretation where U = θ is the parameter of a statistical model, we may interpret P̃ as
DM’s assessment, given data V = S(Xn), of the uncertainty about U , i.e. P̃ is a ‘posterior’
and, analogous to Bayesian terminology, we may call Cv a 95% credible set given V . The
question is now under what conditions we have coverage, i.e. that CV is also a 95% frequentist
confidence interval, so that our credible set can be given frequentist meaning. By definition
of confidence interval, this will be the case iff for all P ∈ P∗, P (U ∈ CV ) = 0.95, i.e. iff for
all P ∈ P∗, v ∈ range(V ),
EP [1U∈CV ] = EP̃ [1U∈CV | V = v], (18)
where we used that, by construction, EP̃ [1U∈CV | V = v] = 0.95 for all v ∈ range(V ). As we
shall see (18) holds for our normal example, so the posterior constructed in (17) produces valid
confidence intervals. (18) is of the form of a ‘safety’ statement and it suggests that confidence
interval validity of credible sets can be phrased in terms of safety in general. Indeed this is
possible as long as P̃ (U |V ) satisfies the scalar density assumption: for fixed 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1,
we can define the set C[a,b]v = [uav, ūbv] where F̃[U |V ](uav | v) = a and F̃[U |V ](ūbv | v) = b, so that
for each v ∈ range(V ), C[a,b]v is a b− a credible set. Reasoning like above, we then get that
C[a,b]V is also a b− a confidence interval iff for all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ range(V )
E(U,V )∼P [1U∈C[a,b]V
] = EPEP̃ [1U∈C[a,b]V
| V = v], (19)
which, from the characterization of safety for U | [V ], Proposition 1, (12) and (14) suggests
the following definition:
Definition 6 Let U , V and P̃ be such that P̃ (U |V = v) satisfies the scalar density assump-
tion for all v ∈ range(V ). We say that P̃ is (strongly) confidence–safe for U | V if for all
0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, it is safe for 1
U∈C[a,b]V
| [V ].
The requirement that P̃ satisfies the scalar density assumption is imposed because otherwise
C[a,b]V may not be defined for some a, b ∈ [0, 1]. We could also consider distributions that have




| 〈V 〉; we have not (yet) found any natural examples though that exhibit weak
confidence-safety but not strong confidence safety.
Example 8 In the next subsection we show that P̃ (θ | V = θ̂(Xn)) as defined in Example 7
(normal distributions) is confidence-safe. For example, we may specify a P̃ (θ | θ̂)–95%
credible set C[a,b]V with a = 0.025 and b = 0.975 as the area under the normal curve centered
at V = θ̂ and truncated so that the area under the left and right remaining tails is 0.025
each. Now suppose that Xn ∼ Pθ for arbitrary θ. By confidence–safety we know that the
probability that we will observe θ̂ such that θ 6∈ C[a,b]V is exactly 0.05, just as it would be if
P̃ where the true conditional distribution — an instance of a safe inference based on P̃ . For
an example of an inference that is unsafe, suppose DM really is offered a gamble for $1 that
pays out $2 whenever θ > 0 (we could take any other fixed value as well), and pays out 0
otherwise. She thus has two actions at her disposal, a = 1 (accept the gamble) and a = 0
(abstain), with loss given by L(θ, 0) = 0 for all θ and L(θ, 1) = 1 if θ < 0 and L(θ, 1) = −1
otherwise. She might thus be tempted to follow the decision rule δ(θ̂) that accepts the gamble
whenever she observes θ̂ such that P̃ (θ > 0 | θ̂) > .5 and abstains otherwise; for that rule
minimizes, among all decision rules, her expected loss Eθ∼P̃ |θ̂[L(θ, δ(θ̂))], and gives negative
expected loss.
This decision rule should not be followed though, because it is based on an inference that
is not safe in any of our senses: safety would mean that P̃ is safe for L(θ, δ(θ̂)) | s, where
s can be substituted by [θ̂], 〈θ̂〉, or θ̂. The first does not apply since θ̂ is not ignored in the
probability assessment; the third does not hold because it would imply the second, which
also does not hold. To see this, note that if data comes from Pθ̄ with θ̄ < 0 then we have
Eθ̂∼Pθ̄
[L(θ̄, δ(θ̂))] > 0 > Eθ̂∼Pθ̄
[Eθ∼P̃ |θ̂[L(θ, δ(θ̂))]],
so that her actual expected loss is positive whereas she thinks it to be negative. This violates
(7) in Definition 1 so that P̃ is not safe for L(θ, δ(θ̂)) | 〈θ̂〉. Note that, if P̃ were safe for θ | θ̂
(as a subjective Bayesian would believe if P̃ were her posterior) then it would also be safe for
L(θ, δ(θ̂)) (because L(θ, δ(θ̂)) can be written as a function of (θ, θ̂)), and then use of δ would
be safe after all.
For an intuitive interpretation, consider a long sequence of experiments. For each j, in
the j-th experiment, a sample of size n = 10 is drawn from a normal with some mean θj .
Each time DM investigates whether θj > 0. Assume that, in reality, all of the θj are < 0, but
DM does not know this. Then every once in a while θ̂ will be large enough for our unsafe
DM to gamble on it, but every time this happens she loses; all other times she neither loses
nor wins, so her net gain is negative in the long run.
Thus, P̃ is not safe for θ | θ̂ in general. However, it is still safe for U ′|V for some other
functions of U ≡ θ besides U ′ = C[a,b]V . For example, it leads to unbiased estimation of the
mean: P̃ is safe for 〈θ〉 | 〈θ̂〉, as is easily established. This is however a special property
of the confidence distribution for the normal location family and does not hold for general
1-dimensional confidence distributions as reviewed below.
3.2 Pivotal Safety and Confidence
Trivially, if P̃ is safe for U |V (hence valid) and the scalar density assumption holds, then
it is also confidence-safe for U |V . We now determine a way to construct confidence-safe P̃
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if not enough knowledge is available to infer a P̃ that is valid. To this end, we invoke the
concept of a pivot, usually defined as a function of the data and the parameter that has the
same distribution for every P ∈ P∗ and that is monotonic in the parameter for every possible
value of the data (Barndorff-Nielsen and Cox, 1994). We adopt the following variation that
also covers a quite different situation with discrete outcomes:
Definition 7 [pivot] Let U and V be as before and suppose either (continuous case) that U :
Z → R and V : Z → R are real-valued RVs, and that for all v ∈ range(V ), range(U |V = v)
is a (possibly unbounded) interval (possibly dependent on v), or (discrete case) that Z is
countable. We call RV U ′ a (continuous viz. discrete) pivot for U | V if
1. (U, V ) U ′ so that the function f with U ′ = f(U, V ) exists.
2. For each fixed v ∈ range(V ), the function fv : range(U |V = v) → range(U ′),
defined as fv(u) := f(u, v) is 1-to-1 (an injection); in the continuous case we further
require fv to be continuous and uniformly monotonic, i.e. either fv(u) is increasing in
u for all v ∈ range(V ), or fv(u) is decreasing in u for all v ∈ range(V ).
3. All P ∈ P∗ agree on U ′, i.e. for all P1, P2 ∈ P∗, P1(U ′) = P2(U ′), where in the
continuous case we further require that P1 (hence also P2) satisfies the scalar density
assumption.
We say that a pivot U ′ is simple if for all v ∈ range(V ), the function fv is a bijection.
The scalar density assumption (item 3) does not belong to the standard definition of pivot,
but it is often assumed implicitly, e.g. by Schweder and Hjort (2002). The importance of
‘simple’ pivots (a nonstandard notion) will become clear below.
In the remainder of this section we focus on the statistical case of the previous subsection,
which is a special case of Definition 7 above — thus invariably U ≡ θ, the 1-dimensional
parameter of a model {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ}, and V is some statistic of data Xn. In Section 3.3 we
return to the discrete case.
If a continuous pivot as above exists, then all P ∈ P∗ have the same distribution function
F[U ′](u
′) := P (U ′ ≤ u′). We may thus define a pragmatic distribution by setting, for all
v ∈ range(V ), all u ∈ range(U | V = v),
F̃[U |V ](u | v) :=
{
F[U ′](fv(u)) if fv(u) increasing in u
1− F[U ′](fv(u)) if fv(u) decreasing.
(20)
The definition of pivot ensures that for each v ∈ range(V ), F̃[U |V ](u | v) is a continuous
increasing function of u that is in between 0 and 1 on all u ∈ range(U | V = v), and hence
F̃[U |V ](u | v) is the CDF of some distribution P̃ (U |V ). It can be seen from the standard
definition of a confidence distribution (Schweder and Hjort, 2002) that this P̃ (U |V ) is a
confidence distribution, and that every confidence distribution can be obtained in this way.8
8Mirroring the discussion underneath Definition 1 from Schweder and Hjort (2002): if F̃ ′(U |V ) is the CDF
of a confidence distribution as defined by them, then U ′ := F̃ ′(U |V ) is a pivot and then the construction
above applied to U ′ gives F̃ (U |V ) := F̃ ′(U |V ). Conversely, if U ′ is an arbitrary continuous pivot, then by the
requirement that P (U ′) has a density with interval support, F (U ′) is itself uniformly distributed on its support
[0, 1] and there is a 1-to-1 continuous mapping between U ′ and F (U ′). Thus, whenever U ′ is a continuous pivot,
F (U ′) is itself a pivot as well, and F̃ (U |V ) as defined here satisfies the definition of confidence distribution.
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Hence, (20) essentially defines confidence distribution. Theorem 2 below shows that when
based on simple pivots, confidence distributions are also confidence-safe.
Example 9 Consider the statistical setting with U ≡ θ, V ≡ θ̂(Xn), and (a) for all θ ∈ Θ,
Pθ(V ) itself satisfies the scalar density assumption, and (b) for each fixed v ∈ range(V ), we
have that Fθ,[V ](v) := Pθ(θ̂(X
n) ≤ v) is monotonically decreasing in θ. This will hold for 1-
dimensional exponential families with a continuously supported sufficient statistic (such as the
normal, exponential, beta- and many other models), taken in their mean-value parameteriza-
tion Θ. Then (by (b)) U ′ = Fθ,[V ](V ) is itself a decreasing pivot, with (by (a)) the additional
property that the function fθ from range(V ) to range(U
′) given by fθ(v) := f(θ, v) is
strictly increasing in v. Then (20) simplifies, because (using this strict increasingness in the
second equality):
Fθ,[V ](v) = Pθ(V ≤ v) = Pθ(Fθ,[V ](V ) ≤ fθ(v)) = Fθ,[Fθ,[V ]](fθ(v)) = F[U ′](fv(θ)),
and noticing that the right-hand side appears in (20), we can plug in the left-hand side there
as well and we see that we can directly set
F̃ (θ | θ̂) = 1− Fθ(θ̂). (21)
Thus for such models the recipe (20) simplifies (see also Veronese and Melilli (2015)).
We now define ‘pivotal safety’ which, as demonstrated below, in the statistical case essentially
coincides with confidence safety — the reason for the added generality is that it also has
meaning and repercussions in the discrete case. The extension to ‘multipivots’ is just a
stratification that means that, given any w ∈ range(W ), P̃ | W = w is pivotally safe for
U | V relative to P∗ | W = w; it is not really needed in this text, but is convenient for
completing the hierarchy in Figure 1.
Definition 8 Let U and V be as before and let P̃ be an arbitrary distribution on Z (not
necessarily given by (20)) . If V has full support under P̃ , i.e. suppP̃ (V ) = range(V )
and U ′ is a (continuous or discrete) pivot such that P̃ is safe for U ′ | [V ], i.e. for all
v ∈ range(V ),
P̃ (U ′ | V = v) = P̃ (U ′),
then we say that P̃ is pivotally safe for U | V , with pivot U ′.
Now let W be a generalized RV such that V  W . Suppose that for all w ∈ range(W ),
U ′ is a pivot relative to the set of distributions (P∗ | W = w) and P̃ is safe for U ′ | [V ],W .
Then we say that P̃ is pivotally safe for U | V with multipivot U |W .
Example 10 [normal distributions and general confidence distributions] In Exam-
ple 7, U = θ, the mean of a normal with variance 1, and we set V = θ̂(Xn) to be the average
of a sample of size n. Then it is easily seen that U ′ = θ − θ̂ = U − V is a pivot according to
our definition, having a N(0, 1) distribution under all P ∈ P∗. If we adopt P̃ (U | V ), under
which U ′ ∼ N(0, 1) independently of V , then P̃ is safe for U ′ | [V ] (see Proposition 1, (12))
so we have pivotal safety. And indeed one can verify that this P̃ coincides with the recipe
given by (20).
20
While in the simplest form of calibration, safety for U | [V ], we had that P̃ (U | V ) was
the marginal of U , so that U and V are independent under P̃ , in the simplest pivotal safety
case, the situation is comparable, but now the auxiliary variable U ′ instead of the original
variable U is independent of V under P̃ . Note though that we do not necessarily have that
U ′ and V are independent for all or even for any P ∈ P∗. In Example 11 (Monty Hall) below,
there is in fact just one single P ∈ P∗ for which U ′ ⊥ V holds. In the statistical application,
we even have that P (U ′ | V ) is a degenerate distribution (putting all its mass on a particular
real number depending on V ) under each P ∈ P∗, as can be checked from Example 7.
The relation between pivotal, confidence-safety and the P̃ defined as in (20) is given by
the following central result.
Theorem 2 The following statements are all equivalent:
1. P̃ is pivotally safe for U |V with some simple continuous pivot U ′
2. P̃ (U |V ) is of form (20), where U ′ is a simple continuous pivot
3. P̃ is confidence-safe for U |V and for each v ∈ range(V ), P̃ (U |V = v) satisfies the
scalar density assumption
4. P̃ is safe for F̃ (U |V )|V and for each v ∈ range(V ), P̃ (U |V = v) satisfies the scalar
density assumption
5. P̃ is pivotally safe for U |V with pivot F̃ (U |V ), which is continuous and simple.
The theorem shows that, whenever pivots are simple (as is often the case), confidence dis-
tributions P̃ as defined by (20) are also confidence-safe. If a pivot is nonsimple however,
confidence distributions can still be defined via (20) but they may not be confidence-safe
under our current definition. An example of such a case is given by the statistical scenario
whereM is the 1-dimensional normal family, but the parameter of interest is U := |θ| rather
than θ. As shown by Schweder and Hjort (2016), the confidence distribution P̃ (U | θ̂) defined
by (20) then gives a point mass P̃ (U = 0 | θ̂ = v) = p > 0 to U = |θ| = 0 whose size p
depends on v. This happens because F̃ (U | v) ranges, for such v, not from 0 to 1 but from
some a > 0 (depending on v) to 1. Then pivotal safety cannot be achieved for P̃ (U |V ), since
there must be v1, v2 with P̃ (U |V = v1) 6= P̃ (U |V = v2) whence the definition is not satisfied.
Now such confidence distributions based on nonsimple pivots are still useful, and indeed we
can prove a weaker form of pivotal and confidence safety for such cases, by replacing safety
for U ′ | [V ] in Definition 8 by safety for U ′ | JV K; we will not discuss details here however.
The Hierarchy To see how pivotal and confidence safety fit into the hierarchy of Figure 1,
note that Theorem 2 establishes the double arrow between pivotal safety and confidence
safety under the scalar density assumption (SDA) — the requirement that (U ′, V )  U in
the figure amounts to fv being a bijection, as we require. The theorem also establishes the
relation between calibration and pivotal safety, under the assumption that P̃ (V ) has full
support and the SDA holds for U . Then the simplest form of calibration, safety for U | [V ],
clearly implies pivotal safety for U | V — just take U ′ = U , which is immediately checked
to be a pivot. This result trivially extends to the general case of safety for U | [V ], V ′ with
V ′ 6= 0, this implying pivotal safety with multipivot U | V ′ — we omit the details.
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It remains to establish the rightmost column of Figure 1; we will only do this in an informal
manner. Schweder and Hjort (2002) (and, implicitly, Hampel (2006)) already note that if P̃
is a confidence distribution for RV U given data V , then it remains a confidence distribution
for monotonic functions U ′ of U , but not for general functions of U . In our framework this
translates to, under the scalar density assumption of Section 3.1, that pivotal safety of U | V
implies pivotal safety for U ′ | V if U ′ is a 1-to-1 continuous function of U , which readily
follows from Definition 7 and Theorem 2 (Definition 7 implies an analogous statement for
the discrete case as well). Similarly, it is a straightforward consequence from the definitions
that calibration for U | V implies calibration for U ′ | V , for every U ′ with U  U ′, not
necessarily 1-to-1; yet for U ′ with (U, V )  U ′, calibration may not be preserved: take e.g.
the setting of Example 1 (dilation) with U ′ = |V − U |. Then P̃ (U ′ = 1 | V = 0) = 0.9,
P̃ (U ′ = 1 | V = 1) = 0.1, yet P∗ contains a distribution with P (U = V ) = 1 and for this P ,
P (U ′ = 1 | V ) ≡ 0. If P̃ is valid for U | V however, validity is preserved even for every U ′
with (U, V ) U ′.
3.3 Pivotal Safety and Decisions
Now we consider pivotal safety for RVs U with countable range(U). The Monty Hall example
below shows that in this case, pivotal safety is still a meaningful concept. We first provide
an analogue of Theorem 2, in which ‘confidence safety’ is replaced by something that one
might call ‘local’ confidence safety: safety for a RV U ′ that determines the probability of
the actually realized outcome U . To this end, we introduce some notation: for distribution
P ∈ P∗ and RV W , let p[W ](·) be the RV that denotes the probability mass function of W ,
i.e. p[W ](w) = P (W = w); similarly p̃[W ](w) := P̃ (W = w). The notation is extended to
conditional mass functions as p̃[U |V ](u|v) := P̃ (U = u | V = v). The subscript [W ] and [U |V ]
indicates the RVs under consideration; we will omit them if they are clear from the context.
We can think of these mass functions as RVs: for all z ∈ Z, p[W ](W )(z) = P (W = W (z));
p̃[U |V ](U |V )(z) = P̃ (U = U(z) | V = V (z)). The difference between RV P̃ (U | V ) and
p̃[U |V ](U |V ) is that the former maps z to the distribution P̃ (U | V = V (z)); the latter maps
z to the probability of a single outcome P̃ (U = U(z) | V = V (z)).
Theorem 3 Let Z be countable, U be an RV and V a generalized RV. Suppose that for all
v ∈ range(V ), all p ∈ [0, 1], #{u : P̃ (U = u | V = v) = p} ≤ 1 (i.e. there are no two
outcomes to which P̃ (U | V = v) assigns the same nonzero probability). Then the following
statements are all equivalent:
1. P̃ is safe for p̃(U |V ) | [V ].
2. P̃ is pivotally safe for U | V , with simple pivot U ′ = p̃(U |V ).
3. P̃ is pivotally safe for U | V for some simple pivot U ′′.
This result establishes that, in the discrete case, if there is some simple pivot U ′′, then p̃(U |V )
is also a simple pivot — thus p̃(U |V ) has some generic status. Compare this to Theorem 2
which established that F̃ (U |V ) is a generic pivot in the continuous case.
We now illustrate this result, showing that, for a wide range of loss functions, pivotal
safety implies that DM has the right idea of how good her action will be if she bases her
action on the belief that P̃ is true — even if P̃ is false. Consider an RV U with countable
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range U := range(U). Without loss of generality let U = {1, . . . , k} for some k > 0 or
U = N. Let L : U × A → R ∪ {∞} be a loss function that maps outcome u ∈ U and action
or decision a ∈ A to associated loss L(U, a). We will assume that A ⊂ ∆(U) is isomorphic to
a subset of the set of probability mass functions on U , thus an action a can be represented
by its (possibly infinite-dimensional) mass vector a = (a(1), a(2), . . .). Thus, L could be any
scoring rule as considered in Bayesian statistics (then A = ∆(U)), but it could also be 0/1-
loss, where A is the set of point masses (vectors with 1 in a single component) on U , and
L(u, a) = 0 if a(u) = 1, L(u, a) = 1 otherwise. For any bijection f : U → U we define its
extension f : A → A on A such that we have, for all u ∈ U , all a ∈ A, with a′ = f(a) and
u′ = f(u), a′(u′) = a(u). Thus any f applied to u permutes this outcome to another u′, and
f applied to a probability vector permutes the vector entries accordingly.
We say that L is symmetric if for all bijections f , all u ∈ U , a ∈ A, L(u, a) = L(f(u), f(a)).
This requirement says that the loss is invariant under any permutation of the outcome and
associated permutation of the action; this holds for important loss functions such as the
logarithmic and Brier score and the randomized 0/1-loss, and many others.
We will also require that for all distributions P for U , there exists at least one Bayes action
aP ∈ A with EP [L(U, aP )] = mina∈AEP [L(U, a)] — which again holds for the aforementioned
loss functions. If there is more than one such act we take aP to be some arbitrary but fixed
function that maps each P to associated Bayes act a. In the theorem below we abbreviate
aP̃ (U |V ) (the optimal action according to P̃ given V , i.e. a generalized RV that is a function
of V ) to ãV .
Theorem 4 Let P̃ (U | V ) be a pragmatic distribution where Z is countable. Suppose that
P̃ (U | V ) is pivotally safe with a simple pivot. Let L : U ×A → R∪{∞} be a symmetric loss
function as above, and let ãV be defined as above. Then P̃ is safe for L(U, ãV ) | [V ], i.e. for
all v ∈ range(V ), all P ∈ P∗,
E(U,V )∼P [L(U, ãV )] = EP̃ [L(U, ãV ) | V = v].
Example 11 [Use of Pivots beyond Statistical Inference: Monty Hall] To illustrate
Theorem 4, consider again the Monty Hall problem (Example 4) where the contestant chooses
door 1. We model this using RV U ∈ {1, 2, 3} representing the door with the car behind it,
and V ∈ {2, 3} the door opened by the quiz master; Z = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 2)} and for
z = (u, v), U(z) = u and V (z) = v (in this representation it is impossible for the quiz master
to open a door with a car behind it). P∗ is the set of all distributions P on Z with uniform
marginal P (U), i.e. as usual, we assume the distribution of the car location to be uniform.
Let P̃ be the conditional distribution for U | V defined by P̃ (U = 1 | V = 2) = P̃ (U =
1 | V = 3) = 1/3. This distribution can be arrived at using Bayes’ theorem, starting with
a particular P ∈ P∗, namely the P with P (V = 2 | U = 1) = P (V = 3 | U = 1) = 1/2,
meaning that when the car is actually behind door 1 and the quiz master has a free choice
what door to open, he will flip a fair coin to decide. As this game was actually played on
TV, it was in fact unknown whether the quiz master actually determined his strategy this
way — a quiz master who would want to be helpful to the contestant would certainly do
it differently, for example choosing door 3 whenever that is an option. Nevertheless, most
analyses, including Vos Savant’s original one, assume this particular P̃ , and wars have been
raging on the wikipedia talk pages as to whether this assumption is justified or not (Gill,
2011).
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Interestingly, if we adopt this fair-coin P̃ then U ′ = 1U=1 becomes a discrete simple
pivot, in our sense, and P̃ becomes pivotally safe, as is easily checked from Definition 7 and
Definition 8: fv in the definition is given by f2(1) = 1, f2(3) = 0, f3(1) = 1, f3(2) = 0 (f2(2)
and f3(3) are undefined). Thus P̃ is pivotally safe for Monty Hall and thus Theorem 4 can
be applied, showing that, if DM takes decisions that are optimal according to P̃ , then these
decisions will be exactly as good as she expects them to be for symmetric losses such as
0/1-loss (as in the original Monty Hall problem) but also for the Brier and logarithmic loss.
Relatedly, van Ommen et al. (2016) shows that basing decisions on P̃ will lead to admissi-
ble and minimax optimal decisions for every symmetric loss function (and, in a sequential
gambling-with-reinvestment context, even when payoffs are asymmetric). This points to a
general link between safety and minimax optimality, which we will explore in future work.
Thus, while a strict subjective Bayesian would be forced to adopt a single distribution here
— for which we do not see very compelling grounds — one can just adopt the uniform P̃ for
entirely pragmatic reasons: it will be minimax optimal and as good as one would expect it
to be if it were true, even if it’s in fact wrong — it may, perhaps, be the case, that people
have inarticulate intuitions in this direction and therefore insist that P̃ is ‘right’.
4 Beyond Conditioning; Beyond Random Variables
We can think of our pragmatic P̃ (U |V ) as probability updating rules, mapping observations
V = v to distributions on U . We required these to be compatible with conditional distribu-
tions: P̃ (U |V ) must always be the conditional of some distribution P̃ on Z, even though this
distribution may not be in P∗. Perhaps this is too restrictive, and we might want to consider
more general probability update rules. Below we indicate how to do this — and present
Proposition 3 which seems to suggest that rules that are incompatible with conditional prob-
ability are not likely to be very useful. We then continue to extend our approach to update
distributions given events rather than RVs, leading to the ‘sanity check’ we announced in the
introduction. For simplicity, in this section we restrict ourselves again to V with countable
range.
Definition 9 [Probability Update Rule] Let U be an RV and V be a generalized RV
on Z where range(V ) is countable. A probability update rule Q̃(U‖V ) is a function from
range(V ) to the set of distributions on range(U). We call Q̃(U‖V ) logically coherent if,
for each v ∈ range(V ), the corresponding distribution on range(U), denoted Q̃(U‖V = v),
satisfies
Q̃(U ∈ {u : (u, v) ∈ range((U, V ))}‖V = v) = 1. (22)
We call Q̃(U‖V ) compatible with conditional probability if there exists a distribution P on
Z with full support for V (suppP (V ) = range(V )) such that Q̃(U‖V ) ≡ P (U | V ).
Logical coherence is a weak requirement: if RVs U and V are logically separated, i.e. range((U, V )) =
range(U)×range(V ) (as is the case in all examples in this paper except Example 11) then
clearly every, arbitrary function from range(V ) to the set of distributions on range(U)
is a logically coherent probability update rule. However, if range((U, V )) 6= range(U) ×
range(V ), then there are logical constraints between U and V . For example, we may have
Z = {1, 2}, and U(z) = V (z) = z (so that U and V are identical). Then a probability
update rule Q̃ with Q̃(U = 1‖V = 2) = 1 would be logically incoherent. Every rule that is
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compatible with conditional probability is logically coherent; there does not seem much use
in using logically incoherent rules.
For given Q̃(U‖V ) we can now define safety for U |V , U |〈V 〉 and calibration for U |V as
before, using Definition 1, 2 and 5. Note however that notions like safety for U | [V ] and
pivotal safety are not defined, since these are defined in terms of marginal distributions for
U (or U ′, respectively), and the marginal Q̃(U) is undefined for probability update rules Q.
Proposition 3 If Q̃(U‖V ) is not compatible with conditional probability, then it is not safe
for U | 〈V 〉 (and hence, as follows directly from the hierarchy of Figure 1, also unsafe for
U | V , and also not calibrated for U | V ).
Proof: Follows directly from the characterization of safety for U | 〈V 〉 given in Proposition 1.
2
This result suggests that rules that are incompatible with conditional probability are not
likely to be very useful for inference about U ; the result says nothing about the weaker
notions of safety with 〈U〉 rather than U on the left though, or with JV K instead of 〈V 〉 or V
on the left.
Conditioning based on Events Suppose we are given a finite or countable set of outcomes
U with a distribution P0 on it, as well as a set V of nonempty subsets of U . We are given the
information that the outcome is contained in the set v for some v ∈ V, and we want to update
our distribution P0 to some new distribution P
′
0(·‖v), taking the information in v into account.
A lot of people would resort to naive conditioning here (Grünwald and Halpern, 2003), i.e.
follow the definition of conditional probability and set P ′0 to Pnaive({u} | v) := P0({u})/P0(v).
We want to see whether such a Pnaive is safe. To this end, we must translate the setting to
our set-up: to make a probability update rule in our sense well-defined (Definition 9), we
must have a space Z on which the RV U , denoting the outcome in U , and V , denoting the
observed set v, are both defined. To this end we call any set Z such that, for all u ∈ U , v ∈ V
with u ∈ v, there exists a z ∈ Z with U(z) = u and V (z) = v, a set underlying U and V
(we could take Z = U × V, but other choices are possible as well). We then set P∗ to be
the set of all distributions P on Z with marginal distribution P0 on U and, for all v ∈ V,
P (U ∈ v | V = v) = 1. We may now ask whether the naive update,
Q̃(U = u‖V = v) := Pnaive({u} | v) (23)
is safe. The following proposition shows that in general it is not:
Proposition 4 [Grünwald and Halpern (2003), rephrased] For given P0, U and V, let
Z be any set underlying U and V and let P∗ be the associated set of distributions compatible
with P0. We have: Q̃(U‖V ) defined as in (23) is the conditional of some distribution Q̃ on
Z that is safe for U | V if and only if V is a partition of U .
If V is not a partition of U , then in some cases Q̃(U‖V ) is still compatible with conditional
probability; then it is still potentially safe for U |V ; in other cases it is not even compatible
with conditional probability and hence by Proposition 3 guaranteed to be unsafe. The main
result of Gill and Grünwald (2008) can be re-interpreted as giving a precise characterization
of when this guaranteed unsafety holds.
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To illustrate, consider Monty Hall, Example 4 again. In terms of events, U = {1, 2, 3}
and V = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}: if Monty opens door x, x ∈ {2, 3}, then the event ‘car behind door
1 or x’, i.e. {1, x} is observed, so Pnaive({1} | {1, 2}) = Pnaive({1} | {1, 3}) = 1/2, leading to
the common false conclusion that the car is equally likely to be behind each of the remaining
closed doors. Clearly though, V is not a partition of U , since it has overlap, so by the
proposition, Pnaive is unsafe for U | V . Intuitively, it is easy to see why: if U = 1, the quiz
master has a choice what element of V to present, and may do this by flipping a coin with
bias θ. Therefore the set P∗ has an element Pθ corresponding to each θ ∈ [0, 1], and the
correct conditional distribution Pθ(U = 1 | V = v) depends on θ in a crucial way (and will in
fact not be equal to Q̃, no matter the value of θ). But DM need not be concerned with any
of these details: what matters is that naive conditioning is not safe, which, by Proposition 3,
is immediate from the fact that V is not a partition of U .
The fact that conditioning is problematic if one conditions on something not equal to
a partition has in fact been known for a long time, see e.g. Shafer (1985) for the first
landmark reference. Our point is simply to show that the issue fits in well with the safety
concept. There is an obvious analogy here with the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox (Schweder
and Hjort, 1996) which presumably could also be recast in terms of safety. As Kolmogorov
(1933) writes, “ The concept of a conditional probability with regard to an isolated hypothesis
whose probability equals 0 is inadmissible.” Safe probability suggests something more radical:
standard conditional probabilities with regard to an isolated hypothesis (event) are never
admissible — if one does not know whether the alternatives form a partition, setting P̃ to be
the standard conditional distribution is inherently unsafe.
5 Parallel, Earlier and Future Work; Open Problems and
Conlusion
5.1 Parallel Work: Safe Testing
There is one application of safe probability that has so many implications that we decided to
devote a separate paper to it, which we hope to finish soon. This is the use of safety concepts
in testing, already alluded to in the introduction. Here, let us just very briefly outline some
main ideas. Consider a testing problem where we observe data XN and h0 stands for a null
hypothesis which says that data are a sample from some P0 belong to a statistical modelM0.
For simplicity we will only consider the case of a point null hypotheses in this mini-overview,
so M0 = {P0} is a singleton. h1 represents another set of distributions M1, which may,
however, be exceedingly large — in fact it may impossible for us to state it exactly, for it may
be, for example, as broad as ‘the data are a sample of text in some human language unknown
to us’. We associate h0 with distribution P0 and corresponding density or mass function p0,
and h1 with some single distribution P1 with associated p1. IfM1 is a parametric model, or
a large but still precisely specifiable model such as a nonparametric model, then we might




but other choices are possible as well, and may sometimes even be preferable.
We now define a ‘posterior’ P̃ (H | XN ) by setting






which would coincide with a standard Bayesian posterior based on prior (1/2, 1/2) if we
used a p1 set in the Bayesian way described above. In that special case it also broadly
corresponds to the method introduced by Berger et al. (1994) that, in its culminated form
(Berger, 2003) provides a testing method that has a valid interpretation within the three
major testing-schools: Bayes-Jeffreys, Neyman-Pearson and Fisher. Readers familiar with
the MDL (minimum description length) paradigm (Grünwald, 2007) will notice that for every
complete lossless code for X1, X2, . . . that encodes X
N with L(Xn) bits, setting p1(X
n) =
2−L(X
x) provides a probability mass function on sequences of length n. Thus, if one has a
code available which one thinks might compress data well, one can set p1 in this non-Bayesian
way. The log-posterior odds log P̃ (h0 | XN )/P̃ (h0 | XN ) = − log p1(Xn) + log p0(Xn) then
have an interpretation as the number of bits saved by compressing the data with the code
L compared to the code that would be optimal under P0; thus, the approach of Ryabko and
Monarev (2005) neatly fits into this framework; so does the Martingale testing approach of
Vovk (1993) in which p1 is determined by a sequential gambling strategy; for any gambling
strategy g, there is a corresponding probability mass function p1 such that the inverse of the
(pseudo-) ‘Bayes factor’
P̃ (h0 | XN )






can be interpreted as the amount of money gained by gambling strategy g under pay-offs
that would be fair (yield no gain in expectation) if the null P0 were true: p1(X
n)/p0(X
n)
is the factor by which one’s initial capital is multiplied if one gambles according to g under
odds that are fair under h0, so that the more money gained, the larger the evidence against
h0. For an example of useful non-Bayesian gambling strategies (or equivalently, distributions
p1) we refer to the switch distribution of van Erven et al. (2007).
Where Safety Comes In One can now base inferences on P̃ (H | XN ) just as a Bayesian
would — with the essential stipulation that one only does this for the subset of inferences
that once considers safe in the appropriate sense. For example, suppose that the data com-
pressor gzip compresses our sequence of data substantially more than our null hypothesis
P0, which says that the outcomes are i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2). Thus, P̃ (H = h0 | XN ) will be
exceedingly small, yet the p1 corresponding to gzip may certainly not be considered ‘true’.
We thus do not want to take the predictions made by p1 for future data XN+1, . . . too se-
riously. We can accomplish this by declaring that p1 is not safe for XN+1 | XN relative to
P∗ | H = h1. Note that we can declare such unsafety without actually precisely specifying
P∗|H = h1, which may be too complicated to do. On the other hand, if we do believe that
p1 accurately describes our knowledge of M1, e.g. M1 is small and p1 is a Bayes marginal
distribution based on substantial prior knowledge codified into Π, then we can declare p1 to
be safe relative to P∗ | H = h1. We thus have a single framework that encompasses both
the Fisherian (falsificationist) and the Bayes/Neyman-Pearson testing paradigms, depending
on what inferences we consider safe. On a technical level however, this framework avoids
many difficulties of the standard implementations of the Fisherian and the Neyman-Pearson
paradigms. Compared to Fisher, we avoid the use of p-values (although the ‘Bayes factor’
(25) can be interpreted as a robustified, sample-plan independent p-value (Shafer et al., 2011,
van der Pas and Grünwald, 2014)). We consider this a very good thing in the light of the
many difficulties surrounding p-values such as (to mention just two) their dependence on the
sampling plan, making them impossible to use in many simple situations and their inter-
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pretation difficulties (Berger, 2003, Wagenmakers, 2007). Compared to Neyman-Pearson’s
original formalism, we do not just get an ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ decision, but also a measure of
evidence (the (pseudo-) ‘Bayes factor’) that can be used to infer stronger conclusions as we
get stronger evidence — in contrast to conclusions based on p-values, such conclusions often
remain safe in the appropriate sense.
Indeed, in the second part of this work we consider safety of P̃ (H | XN ) in terms of loss
functions L(H, δ(XN )) where H ∈ {h0, h1} and δ(XN ) is the Bayes act based on P̃ (H | Xn).
In the simplest case takes δ takes values in the decision set A = {accept, reject}. We find
that, under some conditions on p1, P̃ (H | Xn) is safe for L(H, δ(XN )) | JXN K, i.e. we have
safety in the weakest (but still useful) sense defined in this paper. While standard Type-I
and Type-II error guarantees of the Neyman-Pearson approach can be recast in this way,
safety continues to hold if A has more than two elements with different losses associated —
a realistic situation which cannot be handled by either a Neyman-Pearson or a Fisherian
approach. In this situation, making the right decision means one has to take the strength of
evidence into account — if there is more evidence against h0, then the best action to take
will have lower loss under h1 but higher loss under h0. As soon as there are more than two
actions, measuring evidence in terms of unmodified p-values leads to unsafe inferences; yet
inferences based on the (pseudo)-posterior tend to remain safe.
Furthermore, we can also check whether we retain safety under optional stopping (Berger
et al., 1994, Shafer et al., 2011, van der Pas and Grünwald, 2014). We find that, under further
conditions on p0 and p1, P̃ remains safe for L(H, δ(X
N )) | JXN K, even though N is now a
RV (determined by the potentially unknown stopping rule) with an unknwon distribution.
Interestingly, things get even better with a slight modification of P̃ , where we set P̃ (H = h0 |
XN ) to max{1, p0(XN )/p1(XN )}, i.e. we use the posterior odds as the posterior probability.
With this ‘posterior’ we automatically get (weak) safety under arbitrary optional stopping
and for essentially arbitrary loss functions – no more conditions on p0 and p1 are needed.
The reason is that with this choice P̃ (H | Xn) becomes bounded by a test martingale in the
sense of Vovk (1993) and Shafer et al. (2011). If we want to use the standard posterior as
Berger (2003) does, we either need to change the action δ a little (introducing a so-called
‘no-decision region’, as also done by Berger et al. (1994)) or make strong assumptions about
p0 and p1.
It is often claimed that optional stopping is not a problem for Bayesians, since the Bayesian
inferences do not depend on the sampling plan. For objective Bayesian inference, this is
incorrect (priors such as Jeffreys’ do depend on the sampling plan); for subjective Bayesian
inference, this statement is correct only if one really fully believes one’s own subjective prior.
As soon as one uses a prior partially for convenience reasons — which happens in nearly
all practical scenarios — validity of the conclusions under optional stopping is compromised.
Safe testing allows one to establish validity under optional stopping, in a ‘weak safety’ sense,
even in such cases — essentially, one’s conclusions will be safe under optional stopping under
any P in the set P∗ of possible distributions, not just the single distribution one adopts as a
subjective Bayesian.
5.2 Earlier Work and Future Work
The idea that fiducial or confidence distributions can be used for valid assessment of some,
not all, RVs or events that can be defined on a domain has been stressed by several authors,
e.g. Schweder and Hjort (2002), Xie and Singh (2013), Hampel (2006). The novelty here
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is that we formalize the idea and place it in broader context and hierarchy. The idea of
replacing sets of distributions by a single representative also underlies the MDL Principle
(Rooij and Grünwald, 2011), yet again, without broader context or hierarchy. It is also the
core of the pignistic transformation advocated by Smets (1989) as part of his transferable
belief model, which, apart from the transformation idea, seems to be almost totally different
from safe probability however — it would be interesting to sort out the relations though. I
already noted in the introduction that my own earlier work contains various definitions of
partial notions of safety, but unifying concepts, let alone a hierarchy, were lacking.
Future Work I: Safety vs. Optimality There is one crucial issue though that we
neglected in this paper, and that was brought up earlier, to some extent, by (Grünwald,
2000) and (Grünwald and Halpern, 2004): the fact that mere safety isn’t enough — we want
our pragmatic P̃ to also have optimality properties (see e.g. Example 2 for the trivial weather
forecaster who is calibrated (safe) without being optimal). As indicated by Example 11 in the
present paper, and also by (Grünwald, 2000) and more implicitly by van Ommen et al. (2016),
there is a link between safety and minimax optimality which sometimes can be exploited, but
much remains to be done here — this is our main goal for future work.
Future Work II: Objective Bayes Safe Probability may also be fruitfully be applied
to objective Bayesian inference. For example, consider inference of a Bernoulli parameter
based on an ‘objective’ Jeffreys’ prior π(θ) ∝ θ−1/2(1 − θ)−1/2. Use of such a prior may
certainly be defensible because of its geometric and information-theoretic properties (Rooij
and Grünwald, 2011), but what if we have a very small sample of just 1 or even 0 outcomes?
Then Jeffreys’ prior would tell us, for example, that a bias θ between 0 and 0.01 is 10 times
as likely than a bias between 0.495 and 0.505. Most objective Bayesians would probably not
be prepared to gamble on that proposition.9 This is fine, but then what propositions would
an objective Bayesian be prepared to gamble on, and what not? Bayesian inference has no
tools to deal with this question — and— in a manner similar to characterization of safety for
fiducial distributions — safe probability may offer them.
Future Work III: Epistemic Probability More generally, both objective Bayesian and
fiducial methods have been proposed as candidates for epistemic probability (Keynes, 1921,
Carnap, 1950, Hampel, 2006) but it is unclear how exactly such a notion of probability
should be connected to decision theory — while a Bayesian or frequentist probability of 0.01
on outcome A implies that a (not too risk-averse) DM would be willing to pay one dollar for
a lottery ticket that pays off 200 dollar if A turns out to be the case, for epistemic probability
this is not so clear. Safe probability suggests that it might be fruitful to view epistemic
probabilities as assuming a willingness to bet on a strict subset of all events A that can be
defined on the given space.
Open Problems Other future work involves open problems, as mentioned in the caption
of Figure 1. Of particular interest is whether we can extend confidence safety to multidi-
mensional U . Earlier work (Dawid and Stone, 1982, Seidenfeld, 1992) suggests that then in
9One might object that an actual value of θ may not even exist, and certainly will never be observed, so
one cannot gamble on it. But I could propose this gamble instead: I will toss the biased coin 10000 times,
and only reveal to you the final relative frequency of heads. How much would you bet on it being ≤ 0.01?
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general, there will be multiple, different choices for P̃ , none of which is inherently ‘best’. A
major additional goal for future work is to identify subjective considerations that may lead
one to prefer one choice over another, cf. the idea of ‘luckiness’ (Rooij and Grünwald, 2011).
Another intriguing question is whether safety can be re- construed as an extension of measure
theory — which has also been designed to restrict the notion of (probability) measures so
that they cannot just be applied to any set one likes. Yet another avenue is to extend the
definition of pragmatic distributions using upper- and lower expectations, replacing P̃ by a
set of distributions P̃ (this is briefly detailed in Appendix A.1). Then both P̃ and P∗ would
fall into the ‘imprecise probability’ paradigm; we could still get nontrivial predictions as long
as P̃ is more ‘specific’ than P∗. Such an extension would hopefully allow us to represent the
random-set approach to fiducial inference from Dempster (1968) and its modern extensions,
such as the inferential models of Martin and Liu (2013), as an extension of pivotal safety.
Here confidence-safe probabilities would be replaced by confidence-safe probability intervals;
perhaps one could even arrive at a general description of what applications of Dempster-
Shafer theory (Shafer, 1976, Dempster, 1968) are safe at all, and if so, to what degree they
are safe.
Acknowledgements This manuscript has benefited a lot from various discussions over the
last fifteen years with Philip Dawid, Joe Halpern and Teddy Seidenfeld. Special thanks go
to Teddy as well as to Gert de Cooman and Nils Hjort for providing encouragement that was
essential to get this work done. This research was supported by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO) VICI Project Nr. 639.073.04.
References
Thomas Augustin, Frank PA Coolen, Gert de Cooman, and Matthias CM Troffaes. Intro-
duction to imprecise probabilities. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
O. E. Barndorff-Nielsen and D. R. Cox. Inference and asymptotics. Chapman and Hall, 1994.
J. Berger. Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have agreed on testing? Statistical Science,
18(1):1–12, 2003.
J.O. Berger, L.D. Brown, and R.L. Wolpert. A unified conditional frequentist and Bayesian
test for fixed and sequential simple hypothesis testing. Annals of Statistics, 22(4):1787–
1807, 1994.
David M Blei, Andrew Y Ng, and Michael I Jordan. Latent Dirichlet allocation. the Journal
of machine Learning research, 3:993–1022, 2003.
G.E.P. Box. Robustness in the strategy of scientific model building. In R.L. Launer and G.N.
Wilkinson, editors, Robustness in Statistics, New York, 1979. Academic Press.
Rudolph Carnap. Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press, 1950.
David R Cox. Some problems connected with statistical inference. The Annals of Mathemat-
ical Statistics, 29(2):357–372, 1958.
A Philip Dawid and Mervyn Stone. The functional-model basis of fiducial inference. The
Annals of Statistics, pages 1054–1067, 1982.
30
A.P. Dawid. The well-calibrated Bayesian. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
77:605–611, 1982. Discussion: pages 611–613.
Arthur P Dempster. A generalization of Bayesian inference. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 205–247, 1968.
B. Efron. R. A. Fisher in the 21st century: invited paper presented at the 1996 R. A. Fisher
lecture. Statistical Science, 13(2):95–122, 1996.
R. A. Fisher. The fiducial argument in statistical inference. Annals of Eugenics, 6:391–398,
1935.
R.A. Fisher. Inverse probability. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 26:
528–535, 1930.
Dean P Foster and Rakesh V Vohra. Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika, 85(2):379–390,
1998.
D.A.S. Fraser. The structure of inference, volume 23. Wiley New York, 1968.
D.A.S. Fraser. Inference and linear models. McGraw-Hill New York, 1979.
Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal
of mathematical economics, 18(2):141–153, 1989.
R.D. Gill and P.D. Grünwald. An algorithmic and a geometric characterization of coarsening
at random. The Annals of Statistics, 36(5):2409–2422, 2008.
Richard D Gill. The Monty Hall problem is not a probability puzzle — it’s a challenge in
mathematical modelling. Statistica Neerlandica, 65(1):58–71, 2011.
P. Grünwald. The Minimum Description Length Principle. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2007.
P. Grünwald. Safe probability: restricted conditioning and extended marginalization. In
Proceedings Twelfth European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to
Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2013), volume 7958 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 242–252. Springer, 2013.
P. D. Grünwald. Viewing all models as “probabilistic”. In Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM
Conference on Computational Learning Theory (COLT’ 99), pages 171–182, 1999.
P. D. Grünwald. Maximum entropy and the glasses you are looking through. In Proceedings
of the Sixteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2000), pages
238–246, San Francisco, 2000. Morgan Kaufmann.
P. D. Grünwald and J. Y. Halpern. Updating probabilities. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 19:243–278, 2003.
P. D. Grünwald and J. Y. Halpern. When ignorance is bliss. In Proceedings of the Twentieth
Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2004), Banff, Canada,
July 2004.
31
P.D. Grünwald and J.Y. Halpern. Making decisions using sets of probabilities: Updating,
time consistency, and calibration. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 42:
393–426, 2011.
F. Hampel. An outline of a unifying statistical theory. In ISIPTA, pages 205–212, 2001.
F. Hampel. The proper fiducial argument. In R. Ahlswede, editor, Information Transfer and
Combinatorics, LNCS, pages 512–526. Springer Verlag, 2006.
Jan Hannig. On generalized fiducial inference. Statistica Sinica, pages 491–544, 2009.
J.M. Keynes. Treatise on Probability. Macmillan, London, 1921.
A.N. Kolmogorov. Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Springer-Verlag, 1933.
Dennis V Lindley. Fiducial distributions and Bayes’ theorem. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series B (Methodological), pages 102–107, 1958.
Ryan Martin and Chuanhai Liu. Inferential models: A framework for prior-free posterior
probabilistic inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 108(501):301–313,
2013.
Judea Pearl. Causality. Cambridge university press, second edition, 2009.
Frank P Ramsey. Truth and probability (1926). The foundations of mathematics and other
logical essays, pages 156–198, 1931.
S de Rooij and PD Grünwald. Luckiness and regret in minimum description length inference.
In Prasanta S Bandyopadhyay and M Forster, editors, Handbook of the Philosophy of
Science, volume 7. Elsevier, 2011.
B Ya Ryabko and VA Monarev. Using information theory approach to randomness testing.
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 133(1):95–110, 2005.
T. Schweder and N. Hjort. Confidence, Likelihood, Probability: Statistical Inference with
Confidence Distributions. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Tore Schweder and Nils Lid Hjort. Bayesian synthesis or likelihood synthesis: What does
Borel’s paradox say? Technical Report 46, International Whaling Commission, 1996.
Tore Schweder and Nils Lid Hjort. Confidence and likelihood. Scandinavian Journal of
Statistics, 29(2):309–332, 2002.
T. Seidenfeld and L. Wasserman. Dilation for convex sets of probabilities. The Annals of
Statistics, 21:1139–1154, 1993.
Teddy Seidenfeld. R.A Fisher’s fiducial argument and Bayes’ theorem. Statistical Science,
pages 358–368, 1992.
G. Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence. Princeton University Press, 1976.
G. Shafer. Conditional probability. International Statistical Review, 53(3):261–277, 1985.
32
Glenn Shafer, Alexander Shen, Nikolai Vereshchagin, and Vladimir Vovk. Test martingales,
bayes factors and p-values. Statistical Science, pages 84–101, 2011.
Philippe Smets. Constructing the pignistic probability function in a context of uncertainty.
In UAI, volume 89, pages 29–40, 1989.
T.J. Sweeting. Coverage probability bias, objective bayes and the likelihood principle.
Biometrika, 88(3):657–675, 2001.
Gunnar Taraldsen and Bo Henry Lindqvist. Fiducial theory and optimal inference. The
Annals of Statistics, 41(1):323–341, 2013.
S. van der Pas and P. Grünwald. Almost the best of three worlds: Risk, consistency and
optional stopping for the switch criterion in nested model selection. Technical Report
1408.5724, Arxiv, 2014.
T. van Erven, P.D. Grünwald, and S. de Rooij. Catching up faster in bayesian model selection
and model averaging. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, volume 20,
2007.
T. van Ommen, W.M. Koolen, T.E. Feenstra, and P.D. Grünwald. Updating probability
beyond conditioning on a partition. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2016.
To appear.
Piero Veronese and Eugenio Melilli. Fiducial and confidence distributions for real exponential
families. Scandinavian Journal of Statistics, 42(2):471–484, 2015.
M. vos Savant. Ask Marilyn. Parade Magazine, page 15, 1990. There were also followup
articles in Parade Magazine on Dec. 2, 1990 (p. 25) and Feb. 17, 1991 (p. 12).
V Vovk, A Gammerman, and G Shafer. Algorithmic learning in a random world. Springer,
New York, 2005.
V.G. Vovk. A logic of probability, with application to the foundations of statistics. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, series B, 55:317–351, 1993. (with discussion).
E.J. Wagenmakers. A practical solution to the pervasive problems of p values. Psychonomic
Bulletin and Review, 14(5):779–804, 2007.
P. Walley. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, volume 42 of Monographs on
Statistics and Applied Probability. Chapman and Hall, London, 1991.
D. Williams. Probability with Martingales. Cambridge Mathematical Textbooks, 1991.
Min-ge Xie and Kesar Singh. Confidence distribution, the frequentist distribution estimator
of a parameter: a review. International Statistical Review, 81(1):3–39, 2013.
33
A Technical Extras and Proofs
A.1 Details for Section 2.1: partially specified P̃
As promised in the main text, here we consider P̃ that are only partially specified. We may
think of these again as sets of distributions, just as we do for P∗. For example, consider an
update rule Q̃(U‖V ) as in Definition 9 that is compatible with conditional probability. Such
a Q̃ is a prime example of a partially specified pragmatic distribution: it is the conditional
of at least one distribution P on Z, but there may (and will) be many more, different P for
which it is also the conditional. We may thus associate Q̃ with the (nonempty) set Q̃ of all
such distributions P on Z with P (U | V ) = Q̃(U‖V ). Then clearly, for every RV U ′ on Z
with (U, V )  U ′, all Q1, Q2 ∈ Q̃, we have Q1(U ′|V ) = Q1(U ′|V ); thus the distribution of
such U1|V is determined by Q̃; but for U ′ not determined by (U, V ), there may be Q1, Q2 ∈ Q̃
with Q1(U
′|V ) 6= Q2(U ′|V ) and we may have to make assessments about U ′ given V in terms
of lower- and upper-expectation intervals [infQ∈Q̃ EQ[U | V ], supQ∈Q̃ EQ[U | V ].
A more involved calculation shows that for all Q1, Q2 ∈ Q̃, we have Q1(U |V ′) = Q2(U |V ′)
iff V  V ′  Q(U‖V ); a condition that also plays a role in Theorem 1 on calibration. One
might thus try to state and prove restricted versions of our results, holding for partially
specified Q̃ of this form. In practice though, one also encounters other types of partially
specified Q (for example, in regression contexts the function EQ[U |V ] might be used, but
no other aspect of Q is relevant). It might thus be more useful to generalize the whole
machinery to arbitrary sets of distributions Q̃; an additional potential advantage is that this
might allow us to determine safety of inferential procedures that output sets of probabilities
that are nonsingleton yet avoid dilation, such as the inferential model approach of Martin
and Liu (2013) and more generally Dempster-Shafer theory. To get a first idea of how this
might work, consider the second part of the basic Definition 1. Here we essentially only have
to change P̃ to P̃; nothing else changes:
Definition 10 Let Z be an outcome space and P∗ and P̃ be sets of distributions on Z as
defined in Section 2.1, let U be an RV and V be a generalized RV on Z. We say that (P∗, P̃)
is sharply safe for 〈U〉 | 〈V 〉 if
for all P ∗ ∈ P∗, P̃ ∈ P̃ : EP ∗ [U ] = EP ∗ [EP̃ [U |V ]]. (26)
All other definitions may be changed accordingly. We call the resulting notions ‘sharply’ safe
because it requires, for example, safety for U | V to imply that all distributions in P̃ agree
on P̃ (U | V ), i.e. their conditional distributions of U | V are the same; one could also define
weaker notions in which this is only required for some P̃ ∈ P̃.
A.2 Details for Section 2.2
Proof of Proposition 1, Let k be such that range(U) ⊂ Rk.
Part 1. Safety of P̃ for U | 〈V 〉 implies that for every vector ~a ∈ Rk the RV U~a = 1U≤~a
satisfies, for all P ∈ P,
EV∼PEU~a∼P |V [U~a] = EV∼PEU~a∼P̃ |V [U~a],
which can be rewritten as∑
v∈range(V )
P (V = v)[P (U ≤ ~a | V = v)] =
∑
v∈range(V )
P (V = v)[P̃ (U ≤ ~a | V = v)],
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which in turn is equivalent to P (U ≤ ~a) = P ′(U ≤ ~a) with P ′ as in the statement of the
proposition. This shows that safety for U | 〈V 〉 implies (9). Conversely, (9) implies that for
any function RV U ′ with range(U ′) ⊂ Rk′ with U  U ′, letting f be the function with
U ′ = f(U), we have for every P ∈ P∗,
EU∼P [f(U)] = EU∼P ′ [f(U)] = EV∼PEU∼P̃ |V [f(U)],
which implies that P̃ is safe for 〈U ′〉 | 〈V 〉, Since this holds for every U ′ with U  U ′, safety
for U | 〈V 〉 follows.
Part 2 is just definition chasing. Part 3 follows as a special case of Part 4 with W in the
role of V and V ≡ 0. The if-part of Part 4 is a straightforward consequence of the definition.
For the only-if part, note that from the definition of safety for U | [V ],W we infer that it
implies that for all P ∈ P, for all v ∈ suppP̃ (V ), w ∈ suppP (W ), for all functions f and RVs
U ′ = f(U),
EU∼P |W=w[f(U)] = EU∼P̃ |V=v,W=w[f(U)]. (27)
In particular, this will hold for every ~a ∈ Rk, for the RV U~a = f~a(U) = 1U≤~a. Then (27)
can be written as P (U ≤ ~a | W = w) = P̃ (U ≤ ~a | V = v,W = w). Thus, the cumulative
distribution functions of P (U | W = w) and P̃ (U | V = v,W = w) are equal at all ~a ∈ Rk,
so the distributions themselves must also coincide, and (12) follows.
A.3 Details for Section 2.3
Proof of Proposition 2 We let f0 be the function such that V
f0 P̃ P (U | V ) and we
let f1 = f be such that V
f1 P̃ V
′ (f0 exists by definition, f1 by assumption). We also let
V ′′ ≡ P̃ (U | V ) and note that every v′′ ∈ range(V ′′) is a probability distribution on U .
We first establish (1) ⇔ (2). For this, note that since V f1 P̃ V
′, we have for all v ∈
range(V ), for the v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f1(v) = v′, that
P̃ (U | V = v, V ′ = v′) = P̃ (U | V = v). (28)
If (1) holds, i.e. P̃ (U | V, V ′) ignores V , then the left-hand side in (28) is equal to P̃ (U |
V ′ = v′), and (2) follows by plugging this into (28). Conversely, if (2) holds, then the right
of (28) is equal to P̃ (U | V ′ = v′) for all v with f1(v) = v′, and (2) follows by plugging this
into (28).
(2) ⇒ (3) Suppose that (2) holds. This immediately implies that V ′ f2 P̃ P̃ (U | V ) with
f2(v
′) = P̃ (U | V ′ = v′), which is what we had to prove.
(3) ⇒ (4) Suppose that (3) holds. We may thus assume that V ′ f2 P̃ V
′′( ≡ P̃ (U | V ) )
for some function f2. By equivalence (1) ⇔ (2), which we already proved, it is sufficient
to show that for all v′′ ∈ range(V ′′), for all v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f2(v′) = v′′, we have
P̃ (U | V = v′) = P̃ (U | V ′′ = v′′). Since P̃ (U | V ′′ = v′′) = v′′, it is sufficient to prove that for
all v′′ ∈ range(V ′′) and for all v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f2(v′) = v′′, we have P̃ (U | V = v′) = v′′.
To prove this, fix arbitrary v′′ ∈ range(V ′′). For all v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f2(v′) = v′′,
for all v ∈ range(V ) with f1(v) = v′, we must have f2(f1(v)) = v′′ and hence f0(v) = v′′, so
(by definition of V ′′) P̃ (U | V = v) = f0(v) = v′′. Since (from the fact that V  P̃ V
′ and the
definition of conditional probability) we can write P̃ (U | V = v′) =
∑
v∈range(V ):f1(v)=v′ P̃ (U |
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V = v)αv for some weights αv ≥ 0,
∑
v:f1(v)=v′
αv = 1, and all components of the mixture
must be equal to v′′, it follows that P̃ (U | V = v′) = v′′, which is what we had to prove.
(4) ⇒ (2) We may assume that V ′ f2 P̃ V
′′ ≡ P̃ (U | V ) for some function f2, and
(by equivalence (1) ⇔ (2) which we already established) that for v′′ ∈ range(V ′′), all
v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f2(v′) = v′′, P̃ (U | V ′ = v′) = P̃ (U | V ′′ = v′′). By definition of V ′′, the
latter distribution must itself be equal to v′′, so we get:
P̃ (U | V ′ = v′) = v′′, (29)
We must also have, for all v with f1(v) = v
′, that f2(f1(v)) = v
′′, so f0(v) = v
′′, so, by
definition of V ′′, P̃ (U | V = v) = v′′. Combining this with (29) gives that P̃ (U | V = v) =
P̃ (U | V ′ = v′), and, because V  P̃ V
′, that P̃ (U | V = v, V ′ = v′) = P̃ (U | V ′ = v′). This
must hold for all v′′ ∈ range(V ′′), all v′ ∈ range(V ′) with f2(v′) = v′′, and hence simply
for all v′ ∈ range(V ′) and hence P̃ (U | V, V ′) ignores V .
Final Part By Equivalence (1)⇔ (2), we have for all v′ ∈ range(V ′), all v ∈ range(V )
with f1(v) = v
′, that P̃ (U | V = v) = P̃ (U | V ′ = v′). Combining this equality with the
assumed safety of P̃ for U | V , we must also have, for all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ range(V ) with
f1(v) = v
′, that
P (U | V = v) = P̃ (U | V ′ = v′), (30)
But since P (U | V ′ = v′) must be a mixture of P (U | V = v) over all v with f1(v) = v′ (as in
the proof of (3)⇒ (4) above), and all these mixture components are identical by (30), we get
that P (U | V ′ = v′) = P̃ (U | V ′ = v′). Since this argument is valid for all v′ ∈ range(V ′),
we have established safety for U | V ′.
Proof of Theorem 1 The result (1) ⇔ (3) is almost immediate: calibration of P̃ is
equivalent to having, for each P ∈ P∗, for each v′′ ∈ suppP (V ′′), (note that each such v′′ is
a probability distribution on U):
P (U | P̃ (U | V0) = v′′) = v′′ = P̃ (U | V ′′ = v′′).
Rewriting the expression on the right of the leftmost conditioning bar as V ′′ = v′′, we see
that this is equivalent to having
P (U | V ′′ = v′′) =P P̃ (U | V ′′ = v′′)
which by Proposition 1 is equivalent to safety for U | V ′′ and so (1)⇔ (3) follows. From the
definition of safety for U | [V ], V ′, Definition 1, (3) ⇒ (2) now follows if we can show (by
taking, in (2), V ′ = V ′′ = P̃ (U | V )), that (a) V  P̃ V
′′ and (b) P̃ (U | V, V ′′) ignores V .
The first requirement holds trivially, the second follows from Proposition 2, (3)⇒ (1), taking
again V ′ ≡ P̃ (U | V ) (so that automatically V  V ′ and V ′  P̃ (U | V )).
It now only remains to show (2) ⇒ (3). So suppose that P̃ is safe for U | V ′ and P̃ (U |
V, V ′) ignores V and V  P̃ V
′. By Proposition 2 (1) ⇒ (4), it follows that P̃ (U | V ′, V ′′)
ignores V ′, where V ′′ ≡ P̃ (U | V ). The result now follows by the final part of Proposition 2,
applied with V in the proposition set equal to V ′ and V ′ in the proposition set equal to V ′′.
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A.4 Details for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2 (1) ⇔ (2). First assume U ′ is a simple pivot and that pivotal safety
holds for U ′. Set fv(u) as in Definition 7 and take it to be increasing for each v ∈ range(V )
(the decreasing case is analogous). Since U ′ is a pivot and pivotal safety holds, we have,
for all v ∈ range(V ), u′ ∈ range(U ′), F̃[U ′|V ](u′|v) = F[U ′](u′) so, since fv is strictly
increasing, F̃[U ′|V ](fv(u)|v) = F[U ′](fv(u)) and, because the pivot is simple so fv is a bijection,
F̃[U |V ](u|v) = F[U ′](fv(u)) for all u ∈ range(U | V = v), so F̃[U |V ](u|v) is of form (20).
For the converse, assume again that fv is increasing and take F̃[U |V ](u|v) of form (20).
Then, following the steps above in backward direction, we find that all steps remain valid
and show that for all v ∈ range(V ), u′ ∈ range(U ′), F̃[U ′|V ](u′|v) = F[U ′](u′), which shows
that P̃ is pivotally safe for U |V with pivot U ′.
(1) ⇒ (4). To show that the SDA (scalar density assumption) is satisfied note that,
because U ′ is a continuous pivot, P (U ′) satisfies the SDA by definition; because pivotal
safety holds, so does P̃ (U ′ | V = v) for each v ∈ range(V ). Because the pivot U is simple,
the function fv in Definition 7 is a bijection and it follows that P̃ (
′| V = v) also satisfies SDA
for each v ∈ range(V ).
Now assume that U ′ is an increasing pivot, i.e. the function fv(u) := f(u, v) with U
′ =
f(U, V ) is increasing in u, for all v ∈ V (the decreasing pivot case is proved analogously). For
each b ∈ [0, 1], we have:
{z ∈ Z : F̃[U |V ](U(z) | V (z)) ≤ b}) = {z ∈ Z : F̃[U ′](f( U(z), V (z) ) | V (z)) ≤ b} =
{z ∈ Z : F̃[U ′](f(U(z), V (z))) ≤ b} = {z ∈ Z : F̃[U ′](U ′(z)) ≤ b} =
{z ∈ Z : F[U ′](U ′(z)) ≤ b}, (31)
where the first equality follows because fv must be strictly increasing, the second because
U ′ is a pivot, the third is rewriting and the fourth again because U ′ is a pivot. Because
U ′ is a continuous pivot, it satisfies SDA and thus, for all P ∈ P∗, F (U ′), the CDF under
P of U ′, is uniform, so P (F[U ′](U
′) ≤ b) = b for all b ∈ [0, 1]. Using (31) now gives that
P (F̃ (U |V ) ≤ b) = b.
Since as already established, P̃ (U | V = v) satisfies the SDA, we also have P̃ (F̃ (U |V ) ≤
b | V = v) = b, for all v ∈ range(V ). Together these results imply that P̃ is safe for
F̃ (U |V ) | V .
(4) ⇒ (5). The third requirement of Definition 7 holds by assumption. To show that
the first and second requirements hold, note that by the SDA fv(u) := F̃[U |V ](u|v) must be
continuous strictly increasing as a function of u on range(U) for all v ∈ V, so that F̃ (U |V )
is a pivot, and again by the SDA, fv ranges from 0 to 1 and hence it has an inverse, hence it
is a bijection, so that F̃ (U |V ) is even a simple pivot.
(5) ⇒ (1) is trivial.
(3) ⇔ (4) Let U ′ = F̃ (U |V ). By Proposition 1, (12), safety for U ′ | [V ] is equivalent
to having, for all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ suppP (V ), P (U ′) = P̃ (U ′ | V = v). This in turn is
equivalent to having, for all b ∈ [0, 1], P (U ′ ≤ b) = P̃ (U ′ ≤ b | V = v). Since, by the
SDA, P̃ (U ′ ≤ b | V = v) = b, we get that safety for U ′ | [V ] is equivalent to having for
all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ suppP (V ), all b ∈ [0, 1], P (U ′ ≤ b) = b. But this is just the same as
confidence–safety for U | V with a = 0, which shows (1) ⇒ (2). For the converse, we note
that we have just shown that safety for U ′ | [V ] implies that for all P ∈ P∗, all v ∈ supp(V ),
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all 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, that P (U ′ ≤ b) = b and P (U ′ ≤ a) = a whence P (a < U ′ ≤ b) = b − a,
implying confidence–safety.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let U ′ = p̃(U |V ) and consider the function f with U ′ = f(U, V ) and
let fv(u) be as in Definition 7. The following fact is immediate by the condition of ‘uniqueness
of nonzero probabilities’ imposed on P̃ (U | V = v):
Fact 1. For each v ∈ range(V ), fv is an injection.
We then find, by Definition 7 and 8 that U ′ is a simple pivot and P̃ is pivotally safe iff
for all P ∈ P∗, for all v ∈ range(V ),
P (U ′) = P̃ (U ′) = P̃ (U ′ | V = v),
which, by Proposition 1, (12), is equivalent to P̃ being safe for U ′ | [V ]. This establishes
(1) ⇔ (2). The implication (2) ⇒ (3) is trivial (take U ′ as pivot). Thus it only remains to
show:
(3) ⇒ (1): Let U ′′ be a simple pivot for U | V and suppose that pivotal safety holds with
pivot U ′′. We first show that for each p ∈ [0, 1], p̃[U |V ](U |V ) = p⇔ p̃[U ′′](U ′′) = p, i.e.
{z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p} = {z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](U ′′(z)) = p}. (32)
To see this, note that, because for each v ∈ range(V ), the mapping fv(u) := f(u, v) is a
bijection from range(U | V = v) to range(U ′′), we have
{z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p} = {z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′|V ](fV (z)(U(z))|V (z)) = p} =
{z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](fV (z)(U(z))) = p} = {z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](U ′′(z)) = p},
where the first equality follows from Fact 1 above, the second because of pivotal safety, which
imposes that P̃ (U ′′ | V = v) = P̃ (U ′′) for all v ∈ range(V ), and the third by definition
of fv(u). Thus, (32) follows, and it implies that the two events in (32) must have the same
probability under any single probability measure on Z, in particular under P̃ (· | V = v) for
all v ∈ range(V ) and for all P ∈ P∗, i.e.
P̃ ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p} | V = v) = P̃ ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](U ′′(z)) = p} | V = v) (33)
P ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p}) = P ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](U ′′(z)) = p}). (34)
Since U ′′ is a pivot, P̃ (U ′′ | V = v) is the same for all v ∈ range(V ) and equal to P̃ (U ′′)
and also to P (U ′′), for all P ∈ P∗. Combining this with (33) we find that
P̃ ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p} | V = v) = P ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U ′′](U ′′(z)) = p}).
Rewriting this further using (34) gives
P̃ ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p} | V = v) = P ({z ∈ Z : p̃[U |V ](U(z)|V (z)) = p}),
i.e., setting U ′ = p̃[U |V ](U |V ), we find that for all v ∈ range(V ), P̃ (U ′ | V = v) = P (U ′);
thus P̃ is pivotally safe for U |V with simple pivot U ′, and (1). follows.
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Proof of Theorem 4 By assumption there is some simple pivot U ′ = f(U, V ), such that
for each v ∈ range(V ), the function fv on range(U | V = v) defined as fv(u) = f(u, v)
is a bijection to range(U ′). We now fix some function g : U ′ → range(U) that is 1-to-1
(an injection, not a bijection). Such a function must exist; we can, for example, take f−1v0 for
arbitrary but fixed v0 which exists because fv0 must be a bijection by definition. Also note
that for any bijection f : U → U and its extension to A as defined in the main text, we have,
for every distribution P on U with mass function p and ãP (U) denoting the function from
P (U) to a Bayes act for P (U) (which we assume to exist), by symmetry of the loss:∑
u∈U
P (f(u)) · L(f(u), f(ãP (U))) =
∑
u∈U









P (f(u)) · L(f(u), a) =
∑
u∈U
P (f(u)) · L(f(u), f(ãP (f(U)))),
hence, combining the leftmost and righmost expression,
f(ãP (U)) = ãP (f(U)). (35)
Now repeatedly using symmetry of the loss function and (35), we have:∑
u∈U
P̃ (U = u | V = v) · L(u, ãv) =
∑
u∈U
P̃ ({z : U(z) = u} | V = v) · L(u, ãv) =∑
u∈U
P̃ ({z : fv(U(z)) = fv(u)} | V = v) · L(g(fv(u)), g(fv(ãv))) =∑
u′∈U ′
P̃ ({z : U ′(z)) = u′} | V = v) · L(g(u′), aP̃ (g(fv(U))|V=v)) =∑
u′∈U ′
P̃ ({z : U ′(z)) = u′}) · L(g(u′), aP̃ (g(U ′)|V=v)) =
∑
u′∈U ′
P ({z : U ′(z)) = u′}) · L(g(u′), aP̃ (g(U ′))) =∑
u′∈U ′,v∈range(V )
P ({z : U ′(z)) = u′, V (z) = v}) · L(g(u′), aP̃ (g(U ′))) =∑
u′∈U ′,v∈range(V )
P ({z : U ′(z)) = u′, V (z) = v}) · L(g(u′), aP̃ (g(U ′)|V=v)) =∑
u′∈U ′,v∈range(V )
P ({z : f−1v (U ′(z)) = f−1v (u′), V (z) = v}) · L(g(fv(f−1v (u′))), aP̃ (g(fv(U))|V=v)) =
∑
u∈U ,v∈range(V )
P ({z : U(z) = u, V (z) = v}) · L(g(fv(u)), aP̃ (g(fv(U))|V=v)) =∑
u∈U ,v∈range(V )
P ({z : U(z) = u, V (z) = v}) · L(g(fv(u)), g(fv(aP̃ (U |V=v)))) =∑
u∈U ,v∈range(V )
P ({z : U(z) = u, V (z) = v}) · L(u, ãv) = EU,V∼P [L(U, ãV )],
and the result follows.
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